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By international standards, establishment of the Ombudsman institution is regarded as 
demonstrating government commitment to democratic consol idation, and good 
governance ideals such as transparency, accountability, human rights promotion, 
responsive and responsible public service and social justice. In essence, the 
Ombudsman institution supplements and performs the traditional accountability and 
oversight functions over the executive for and on behalf of Parliament. and the 
general citizenry. 
In the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, and in particular in 
South Africa and Bots\vana, the Ombudsman institution was only established in the 
1995 and 1997 respectively. The institution is still at an infant stage and needs to be 
nurtured and protected. The study seeks to demonstrate and evaluate the extent to 
which this institution has been effective in delivering justice in the public service. 
The comparative evaluation of the institution in the two countries seeks to find out the 
impact of the institution in society and the challenges that the institution encounters 
and hence inf1uence strategic interventions for improved performance. The positive 
impact of the institution in the lives of those \vho know of its existence. role and 
functions is significant. It is however noted that the Ombudsman institution faces a 
plethora of challenges and problems that need attention if its effectiveness. integrity, 













1.1 What an Ombudsman is 
In simple terms. the office of the ombudsman is intended to protect the citizens from undue 
interference. negligence and errors of governmental of1icials (Kjekshus. 1971 cited in 
Jacomy-Millette. 1994: 150). 
An ombudsman is an officer of state appointed to provide an extra check on the citizens' 
rights against governmental activity (Robertson. 2002;357). In principle. such an office or 
institution enables citizens who feel that they have been victims of maladministration to 
make a complaint to the Ombudsman seeking some form of relief. The officer will then after 
ensuring that the complaint is not malicious or trivial call for evidence on the matter and 
investigate the fairness or justice of the administrative action complained against. Where 
evidence of the alleged maladministration or injustice is found convincing. a variety of 
remedies is provided (Robertson, 2002:357). 
In its classic form. the Ombudsman is defined as "an office established by constitution or 
statute. headed by a high level public of1icial who receives complaints about injustice and 
maladministration from aggrieved persons against government agencies. officials and 
employees or \\'ho acts on his own initiative" (AyenL 1996:32-33). According to Ayeni, "the 
Ombudsman has powers to investigate. criticise. recommend corrective actions and generally 











essentially a complaint-handling institution ... complaints and gnevances are defined as 
expressions of displeasure, pain and/or resentment towards services or opportunities provided 
by an authority" (Ayeni, 1996:33). It is headed by an experienced. high level public official, 
who may be appointed by the head of state or elected by parliament (Ayeni. 1996: 17) to 
perform accountability and oversight function on executive action on behalf of the 
Legislature. Hence Ayeni argues that a situation should not be allowed where the executive 
can easily abolish the Ombudsman when they see its operations as conflicting with their 
interests or \vhen they think it is a luxury to maintain. 
The role of the Ombudsman is to protect the people against violation of rights. abuse of 
powers. error. negligence, unfair decisions and maladministration in order to improve public 
administration and make the governmenf s actions more open and the government and its 
servants more accountable to members of the public (101. 2005: 1). According to the 
International Ombudsman Institute (lOI, 2005), to protect people's rights, the Ombudsman 
has various powers, namely to: investigate whether the administration of government is being 
performed contrary to law or unfairly: investigate and uncover improper administration, and 
make recommendation to eliminate the improper administrative conduct; and report on its 
activities and complaints in specific cases to government and make necessary 
recommendations to government, or to the legislature depending on the nature of the case, 
and in most cases make annual reports on their work to the legislature and the public III 
general (101. 2005: 1). 
The Ombudsman usually does not have the power to make decisions that are binding on the 
government: rather the ombudsman makes recommendation for change. as supported by a 










the Ombudsman office is the independence of the office from the Executive/administrative 
branch of government" (101, 2005: 1). It is important that the Ombudsman is independent 
from all the other institutions or authority so that it can operate to fulfi I its mission without 
undue pressure (AyenL 1996:22). Ayeni observes that "the institution must be able to make 
decisions in a free and fair manner without fear of reprehension from those who may be 
offended by its recommendations" (1996:22). liowever, the Ombudsman does not have the 
legal authority or power to enforce its decisions like other Anti-Corruption Agencies. 
1.2 Historical Development of the institution 
The creation of the office of the Ombudsman. in its modern form. dates back to 1713 when 
King Charles X 11 of Sweden appointed an Ombudsman called the Chancellor of Justice. In 
1809, major changes in the system of government in Sweden took place and a more 
democratic constitution was adopted (National Democratic Institute (NDI), :2000: 6). 
Provision was made for a new office called '~justitieombudsman" to supervise public 
administration (Fourie quoted in NDt 2000:6). The term Ombudsman has become too 
established to be challenged because it is now generally regarded as being merely descriptive 
of the functions performed (Fombad. 2001:61). The term has been loosely translated as 
'citizen's or people's defender', grievance man or 'public watchdog' (Rovvat cited in Fombad 
2001:61). Other descriptive titles are Tanzania's Public Complaints Commissioner, South 
Africa's Public Protector and Botswana's Ombudsman also knov.;n as the Public Protector or 
. A10sirelelsi " 
Meaningful development of the institution internationally dates to the 1960's. '('he period 











\\orldwide (NDL 2000:6). It is worth noting that "many countries adopted an Ombudsman 
after independence from colonial rulers and/or periods of autocratic domestic rule" (NDL 
2000:6). According to the National Democratic Institute (NDI. 2000:6). "during this period. 
human rights issues and democratic values gained centre-stage on international forums". 
Thus. there is a clear connection between the international emphasis on human rights and the 
development of the Ombudsman. A case can be made that the international development and 
expansion of the Ombudsman office is consistent with transitions to democracy (ND L 
2000:7). That is to say. the creation of the Ombudsman evolved parallel to or at the same 
time that countries were democratising. 
The International Ombudsman Institute (IOI) (cited in NDI: 7) emphasises the confluence of 
democracy and the Ombudsman by explaining that: 
. .. The transition of many countries to democracy and democratic 
structures of government over the past two decades has led to the many 
Ombudsman offices during this most recent period. This transition to 
democracy accompanied by the reform of government including the 
Ombudsman and Ombudsman-human rights complaint office. has been 
evident particularly in Latin America. Central and East Europe. as well 
as in parts of Africa and Asia-Pacific (NDL 2000:7). 
In fact the NDI posits that "ombudsman structures now exist in more than 90 countries in any 
number of different permutations ... while in several cases, the institution exists only at a sub-
national leveL and the overwhelming majority of countries have national structures' (ND!. 
2000:6). 
The institution gained momentum and recognition in the Southern African Region following 











Southern Africa'. According to Ayeni (1996:35). the Ombudsman as an institution, is part of 
a greater design to indigenise the governmental system adopted from colonial masters. and 
has been modified in some instances to suit prevailing political realities. Hence. Ayeni argues 
that. .. the Ombudsman is essentially an adaptation of the Scandinavian version" (1996:35). 
Tanzal11a and Mauritius were the first African countries to adopt the idea of Ombudsman 
(Ayeni, 1996:36). Ayeni (1996:37) argues that Tanzania established the Permanent 
Commission of Enquiry (peE) in 1967 to effectively advance its reconstitution into a one-
party socialist state. Mauritius followed as the next African country to establish the office 
upon its parliamenfs enactment of the relevant legislation in 1969 (AyenL J 996:37). 
According to Ayeni, "there is something ironic about the fact that the earl y transplants of this 
institution were in two contrasting political arrangements". On one hand. he argues that this 
was possible because African countries preferred to judge the Ombudsman ot1ice essentially 
by its utilitarian value. He posits that Mauritius as a plural society needed the institution "to 
avail its diverse population some avenue to express their differences." whilst in contrast, 
Tanzania vvhich is heterogeneous, "had on the principle of unifying the state under a one-
party system." (sic) but still needed some measures to allow its people a voice in governance 
(sic) (Ayeni. 1996:37). Accordingly. the two cases are an indication of not only the 
willingness to use the institution but to also adapt it to constitutional realities. 
Moreover. Ayeni (1996; 37) observes that Tanzania and i\1auritius are former British 
colonies. and therefore argues that. .. there is a possibility that the Ombudsman concept 
travelled through that route". The foregoing appropriately characterise the circumstances 
under vvhich the Ombudsman institution became operative in most of the SADC countries. 











aptly reflected in the commitment to, and prevailing strategy of designing Ombudsman 
institutions world-wide (Ayeni, 1996:42). It is however important to note that the 
Ombudsman in Africa has been described as a "sturdy import'". having been adopted by 
regimes that had little resemblance to the liberal democracies \vith which the institution is, in 
its classic form. usually associated (Hatchard 1986 cited in Fombad, 2001 :59). Tanzania's 
Public Commission of Enquiry (PC E), like Zambia's Commission for Investigation (CFn, 
operated under a one-party system, while Nigeria' s Public Complaints Commissioners (PCE) 
was conceived and for some time operated \vithin a military dictatorship. Under the 
Apartheid system, South Atrica sought to use the institution to mask the inherently anti-
democratic and inhuman nature of the regime: in Victor A}'eni's \vords. South Africa 
represented "a typical case of the Ombudsman as placebo" (AyenL 1996:40; Fombad, 
2001 :59). Judged from this (classic model) perspective, some analysts have considered 
Ombudsman's performance on the continent as disappointing (Hatchard 1986 cited in 
Fombad. 2001 :59). Nevertheless, "whatever the reasons for adopting the Ombudsman 
institutions. and even where they have not worked as well as envisaged in classical models, 
most studies of their operation on the continent sho\\s clearly their very existence made for 
better conditions than those that prevailed in their absence" (Hatchard 1996 cited in Fombad 
2001: 59). 
According to Fombad: 
The institution is now generally accepted as one of the essential 
components of the current democratic transition in Africa. Most recent 
constitutional reforms provide for it in one form or another, Some of 
these are a considerable improvement on the first generation of 
Ombudsman institution: they attempt to reflect the more open, and 











In this light the institution amongst others like the Human Rights Commissions, Anti-
Corruption Agencies and Independent Electoral Commissions are regarded, to borrow 
Diamond's concepts, as "strengthening, enhancing. deepening. and consolidating 
democracy" (Diamond, 1999:64-112). The 1990's Ombudsman adoptions took place against 
the background of the intense fear of human rights abuses in the region's newly established 
democracies (Ayenj, 1996:42). 
One of the major consequences of the winds of change blov\'ing through Africa since the 
early 1990's has been the search for more effective methods of promoting good governance 
(Fombad. 2001 :57). In Africa, where there has been an historical record of bad governance, 
improving the socio-political environment has been given a central place in the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) - an initiative that represents the latest 
attempt by African leaders to place the African continent on a path of sustainable 
development encompassing good governance and prosperity with a consolidation of peace, 
security, and stability (Hope, 2003:2). Consequently, the challenge for African policy-
makers. under NEPAD, is to shape policies and institutional development 111 ways that 
enhance good governance and sustainable development (Hope. 2003:4). 
According to Hyden (cited in Akokpari 1999: 70). "good governance is a genenc term 
referring to the task of running a government or an organisation" As for Hope (2003). 
Good governance is taken to mean a condition whereby responsibility 
is discharged in an effective. transparent. and accountable manner 
while bad governance is associated with maladministration in the 
discharge of responsibility. Good governance entails the existence of 











administrative, economIC, corporate - and entrenched rules that 
promote development, protects human rights. respects the rule of la\v, 
and ensures that people are free to participate in. and be heard on. 
decisions that affect their lives (Hope, 2003 :2-3). 
As Danevad argues in 1995 (cited in Molomo 1998:200). "democracy is measured by the 
extent to v,:hich governments are responsive to the needs of the people and properly account 
for their actions". Similarly, as Wiseman and Charlton cited in Molomo (1998:200) points 
out: "contribution to development is made by the operations of an efficient and essentially 
non-corrupt state structure and the sound policy choices made by an astute political 
leadership". The former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire corroborated this view 
in his address to the African-American Summit in Dakar. Senegal that. "the absence of good 
governance is conducive to the emergence of suspicion among the governed. political 
instability. and the erosion of investor confidence" (Mothibi. 1995 cited in Molomo. 
1998:200). 
Barkan cited in Molomo (1998:201), argues that the advancement of democracy and good 
governance in the world at large, and Africa in particular. is a matter that has been on the 
agenda of bilateral assistance programmes of \vestern democracies since the end of the 
Second World War. especially in countries like the United States. Canada. Germany, the 
Netherlands and the Scandinavian nations). In addition to these bilateral efforts. multilateral 
organisations including the World Bank, the United Nations. the Commonwealth as well as 
regional organisations such as European Union and the Organisation of African Unity (now 
the African Union), have a concern for political reform in their agendas (Barkan cited in 
Molomo (1998:201). These institutions put emphasis on good governance, which include 











transparency, and zero tolerance to corruption. In this respect '"good governance involves the 
adoption of processes and the building of institutions that promote basic welfare, democracy, 
social and economic development" (Akokpari, 1999: 74). AkokparL aptly notes, with 
reference to Lesotho, that the Ombudsman has a critical role to play in fostering good 
governance, protecting human rights, ensuring accountability on the part of public ot11cers. 
and exposing corruption and inet11ciency. all of \\hich hampers development (Akokpari. 
1999:74). 
According to Sharma (2000: 13), the desire to strengthen public ethics and accountability is 
an important point from which the office of the Ombudsman should be viewed. He observes 
that: 
The declining standards of ethics and integrity in Afriean public 
services have been matters of serious concern for years ... in spite of 
growing realisation of the need to maintain high standards of ethical 
behaviour; there has been noticeable decline in moral values of 
public servants. Existing mechanisms of control and accountability 
are proving to be inadequate and ineffective for ensuring a just and 
responsible administration (2003: 13). 
'rhus, the Ombudsman office is seen as an administrative reform or measure for promoting 
higher ethical standards. It is thus, argued that the office is equally reconcilable with 
prevailing government concerns about administrative reforms to bring about responsible. 
responsive and sensitive public service, enhanced productivity, improved performance, 
timely delivery, cost-effectiveness and value for money. It is assumed therefore that, the 
oftice helps complement other government departments towards realising agreed standards of 











The Ombudsman concept has increasingly become a consideration in the light of attempts to 
establish viable democracies, and thereby ensuring that the ordinary citizen is heard and that 
his or her rights and interests are protected (Ayeni. 1996:35). 
1.3 Problems and Challenges ofthe institution 
Although there is good rationale and intent for the Ombudsman institution, it is not without 
its problems and challenges. According to Fombad: 
One of the major problems that have hampered the effectiveness of 
the Ombudsman institution, especially in Africa, is doubt about the 
independence and impartiality of the oflice holder. This has usually 
centred on issues of appointment tenure. staffing. budgeting. and 
other related matters (Fombad. 2001 :60). 
According to Fombad (2001:61): 
In Africa. the Ombudsman is generally appointed either solely by the 
President or by him/her after some form of consultation. In either case, 
the President has acted as the de {i:{c/o appointing authority. The 
philosophical rationalisation of this, based on the premise that the 
President is the embodiment of national virtue, is at odds with the 
practical realities of the African scene where presidents have been at 
the forefront of flagrant corruption and abuse of power. 
The mode of appointment for the institution is consistent \\/ith the often expressed exemption 
of the Head of the Executive from its scrutiny (Interim Constitution of Tanzania 1965 











Imv and constitutional obligations that should be respected to the letter, and are supposed to 
be supreme to all even the Presidency. If this is not seen to be the case, it conjures images of 
some 'weaknesses' on the institution. 
A crucial condition for the effectiveness of the Ombudsman institution is its independence 
from all branches of government, and especially from the Executive branch. which is usually 
its main oversight focus. 'Independence' is hmvever, a contested term. [t means different 
things to different people. Whilst it could mean independence from other government 
institutions, it could also mean independence from a predominant one party system and the 
Executive branch of government both of which owe their allegiance to party-line or 
discipline. This is particularly true in parliamentary systems. which are typified by a fusion 
of powers behveen the Legislative and Executive branches of government (UNDP. 2005:2). 
Accordingly: 
... [n a parliamentary system. the constituency of the Executive and 
the Legislature are the same. If the ruling party is voted out of the 
Legislature, the Executive also changes. Continued co-operation of the 
Legislative and the Executive is required for the government to survive 
and to be effective in carrying out its programs (UNDP, 2005:2). 
Cachalia (2001). on his part observes that: 
Parliamentary system tends. ho\vever. also to produce an 
imbalance in the relationship between the executive and 
Parliament/Legislature and a subordination of internal \\orkings 
of Parliament/Legislature to the requirements of the government. 
'rhis is so because the members on whose support the government 
is dependent to sustain it in office. and who are subject to party 











to critical scrutiny. This can lead to a \veakening of 
Parliament/Legislatures investigative and oversight roles and to 
less transparency, accountable and effective government" 
(Cachalia, 2001:1). 
In a normative sense, Members' of Parliament should be at the forefront in reqUIring 
accountability from its Executive without being biased due to political affiliation or 
deference. They should on this basis not fail to make government led by their political party, 
account their decisions without necessarily paying homage to political party positions on 
matters of national interest which require them to use their conscience. 
A recent empirical survey of the public perception on the Ombudsman reveals that "more 
than 50% of the sample believed that efficacy and independence of an Ombudsman could be 
enhanced if the office were made accountable to a body akin to the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on the British Ombudsman" (PCA) (Mireku, 1992:111 cited in Mireku, 1993:17). 
It has become conventional in Ombudsman practice world-wide, that a parliamentary 
committee would particularly ensure that Public Protector's recommendations are 
implemented by all government departments (Mireku, 1993: 18). 
Literature regarding performance of the Ombudsman reveals that it is a difficult institution 
to systematically evaluate (Ayeni, 1996:47). Hoviever, Gregory (cited in Aycni, 1996:47) 
has re-stated a number of popular criteria for the effectiveness of the Ombudsman as 
impartiality and independence; visibility and access; jurisdiction; speed; adequacy of 
remedial action secured and; effectiveness in obtaining compliance with recommendations. 
This is the criterion against which the Ombudsman institution in any given circumstance 











2.0 CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 METHODOLOGY 
The study is concerned with evaluating the performance of the Ombudsman/Public Protector 
institution in the two countries, namely. South Africa and Botswana. The intention is to 
comprehensively study and evaluate the institution'5 performance. and to make a critical 
assessment of their efficacy. 
To do this it is necessary to establish what the mISSIOn, objectives and goals of the two 
institutions are in each case. I first establish their institutional objectives and strategic goals. 
And then go on to identify performance measures and indicators that allow objective 
assessment of the two offices. 
In doing the above, the research in the South Africa Public Protector uses information 
contained in the annual reports, Justice and Constitutional Development Committee Reports 
on Chapter 9 institutions, (Public Protector falls within this committee's mandate), special 
reports and selected cases prepared by the Public Protector's office. As for Botswana, 
published articles on the Ombudsman, media articles, annual reports and special reports on 
the activities of the institution will be used. Effort is also made to establish how each of the 
institutions under study measure their own performance. and to critically find out hmv 
eftecth~e and reliable these measures, are in terms of the institution being able to process or 
resolve disputes, and the ability to secure compliance from government organs falling under 
their mandate. The study will also tind whether or not the content of the Ombudsman reports 











find out from the annual reports whether the predetermined objectives of the institution are 
met. 
The independence of the institution is evaluated on the basis of the legal framework that 
obtains in each of the cases; in terms of constitutionality and legal protection of the office 
from abuse or abolition by those who might uncomfortable with its existence. Functional 
independence is another area in which the office' s performance is evaluated. This involves 
looking at issues such as manpower availability. financial sustainability and autonomy. 
Opinion from Kon-Governmental Organisations. scholarly contributions and media articles 
regarding the performance of the ombudsman provide another basis upon which an informed 
position on the institution's impact is assessed. These wide sources help to safeguard the 
study against a biased evaluation based only on the Public Protector's reports. 
The names Ombudsman and Public Protector will be llsed interchangeable in the study, as 
they are otl1cial names in both countries. They refer to the same institution. 
2.2 Limitations 
A major limitation of the study is that there is not much empirical based literature on the two 
institutions. This therefore means that the study heavily relies on primary sources of data 
such as journals, public protector's annual reports. media reports and journal articles. 
Besides. the Ombudsman institution in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) region, including the two cases under consideration. is still relatively new. It is 











regarding its effectiveness in the two countries is currently very limited. The study is also 
devoid of critical voice of members of the public who are supposed to be the clientele for the 
institutions. and that this is mainly due to lack of the necessary resources. This could be 











3.0 CHAPTER THREE: 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC PROTECTOR 
3.1 Rationale and Functions 
With the founding of democratic rule in South Africa in 1994. it was decided that the Public 
Protector should also form part of the established institutions that will safeguard fundamental 
human rights and prevent the state from treating the public in an unfair and high handed 
manner (Public Protector Rep0l1, 1997; 1). The Public Protector in South Africa substituted 
the Ombudsman office that prevailed during the Apartheid era in homeland areas such as 
former Bophuthats\vana. 
The Public Protector is established in terms of Chapter 9 of the Constitution of South Africa 
of 1996. as one of the 'institutions supporting constitutional democracy'. Thus the Public 
Protector's office is as per section 181 (1), intended to "strengthen constitutional democracy" 
(Pienaar, 2000:3). Hence Pienaar argues that "strictly speaking the Public Protector's office 
fulfils this mandate by simply protecting the public against the might of the state" (Pienaar, 
2000:3). 
Section 182( 1) of the South African Constitution of 1996 gives the Public Protector the 
toll owing functions: 
a)to investigate any conduct 111 state affairs, or in the public 
administration in any sphere of government. that IS alleged or 
suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice) 











2) The Public Protector has additional powers and functions prescribed 
by national legislation; 
3) The Public Protector may not investigate court decisions: 
4) The Public Protector must be accessible to all persons and 
communities; 
5) Any report issued by the Public Protector must be open to the public 
unless exceptional circumstances, to be determined in terms of 
national legislation, require that a report be kept confidential. 
The execution of functions of the Public Protector's office is provided for by the Public 
Protector Act of 1994 as amended by Public Service Laws Amendment Act 47 of 1997, 
Public Protector Act 113 of 1998, Promotion of Aceess to Information Act 2 of 2000, Public 
Protector Amendment Act 22 of 2003 and Prevention and Promotion and Combating of 
Corruption Act 12 of 2004 
As per the Public Protector report of 1997:6. the Public Protector. is required by the 
constitution to ensure that Public Administration adheres to a number of princi pIes as set out 
in section 195( 1) of the Constitution of South Africa as quoted below: 
a) A high standard of professional ethics mllst be promoted and 
maintained. 
b) Efficient. economic, and effective use of resources must be promoted. 
c) Public Administration must be development ~oriented. 
d) Services must be provided impartially. fairly. equitably and without 
bias. 
e) People's needs must be responded to. and the public must be 
encouraged to participate in policy-making. 
f) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely. 
accessible and accurate information. 
g) Good human- resource management and career development practices, 











h) Public Administration must be broadly representative of the South 
Africa people. with employment and personnel management practices 
based on ability, objectivity. fairness. and the need to redress the 
imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation. 
3.2 Independence of the Public Protector 
The Public Protector and other 'State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy" as 
per section 181 (2) of the Constitution of South Africa of 1996. and other related sub sections 
are: 
... Independent. and subject only to the constitution and the law. and 
that they must be impartial and must exercise their powers and perform 
their functions without tear, favour and prejudice 
(3) Other organs of the state, through legislative and other measures, 
must assist and protect these institutions to ensure the independence. 
impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these institutions 
(4) No person or organ of state may interfere 'vvith functioning of these 
institutions 
(5) These institutions are accountable to the National Assembly. and 
must report on their activities and the performance of their duties to 
the Assembly at least once a year. 
3.3 !'1anner of Appointment 
The appointment of the Public Protector is provided for by the Constitution of 1996. Section 
193(3). which provides that ·'the President. on recommendation of the National Assembly. 
must appoint the Public Protector". In addition. section 193(5) further prescribes that: 











(a) nominated by a committee of the Assembly proportionally composed 
of members of all parties represented in the National Assembly: and 
(b) approved by the Assembly by resolution adopted with a supporting 
vote- i) of at least 60 per cent of the members of the Assembly ... 
The removal from office of the Public Protector is also provided for in Section 194 of the 
Constitution of 1996. Accordingly, "he or she can only be removed from office on (a) 
grounds of misconduct, incapacity and incompetence (b) a finding to that effect by a 
committee of the National Assembly; and (c) the adoption by the Assembly of a resolution 
calling for that person's removal from office". Sub section 2 further provides that "a 
resolution of the National Assembly concerning the removal of the (a) the Public Protector 
or the Auditor General must be adopted with a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of the 
members of the Assembly ... " Sections 1 A and 2A of the Public Protector Act 1994 as 
amended in 1998 also provide and prescribe the same mechanism of appointing the Public 
Protector and Deputy Public Protector, terms and conditions of employment respectively. 
3.4 Performance Measurement 
In order to evaluate the performance of the Public Protector, it is first necessary to identify its 
mission, objectives and values. The office of the Public Protector is a relatively new one in 
the South African legal system whose institutional activity is developing with distinctly 
positive results (Public Protector, 1997:4). According to the 1997 annual report "the office of 
the Public Protector has consolidated the strategic perspectives which gave clarity to its 
institutional mission and vision" (Public Protector, 1997:7). However, the study reveals that 
the office started developing a Strategic Plan in March 2004 (Parliament No.98 of 











for evaluation. Below are the mISSIon. objectives and values against which the office' s 
performance is assessed: 
3.4.1 Mission Statement 
"The office of the Public Protector is committed to assisting Parliament in strengthening 
constitutional democracy in the Republic of South Africa by enhancing fairness and 
efficiency in the provision of governmental services by combating injustice and unfairness in 
Public Administration, making government agents accountable for their actions and 
recommending corrective action" (Public Protector. 2001102: 12 ).It is however, difficult to 
assess whether or not the Public Protector is achieving its mission or not because their reports 
are silent on this important aspect 
3.4.2 Objectives 
The Public Protector Report (2001102: 12) stipulates the objectives as follows: 
- To develop community awareness of the existence of the office, the 
services it provides and how to lodge a complaint; 
- To facilitate access to the office by the entire community; 
- To investigate matters on own initiative or on receipt of complaints 
from the community; 
- To provide independent, objective and impartial investigation. and to 
seek equitable remedies for those affected by defective administration; 
- To identify systemic deficiencies in the administration and seek 
solutions; 
- To provide advice to government on matters relating to administrative 











- To ensure that public officials are not subjected to unfair or 
unjustifiable criticism or blame; 
- To offer guidance to people \V"hose complaints fall outside the 
jurisdiction of the office by referring them to relevant agencies: 
- To foster a culture of human rights within the public service. 
No attempt is ever made on the reports to show whether the objectives are being achieved or 
not. This is yet another grey area regarding the content of these annual rep0l1s. 
3.4.3 Values 
The guidelines in achieving the institution's mission are: 
Impartiality. efficiency. objectivity, professionalism. accountability and 
where necessary. confidentiality. The office is committed to treating 
people \-vith courtesy, consideration, openness and honesty. and respect to 
their privacy (Public Protector. 2001/02; 12) 
Dissatisfaction on the performance of the Public Protector emanates from the extent to which 
the Ombudsman is perceived as impartial by members of the public and media houses. The 
questions regarding the manner in which investigations into high profile cases such as the 
oil gate scandaL investigation into the appointment of Dr Goqv,ana as MEC of Health by the 
Eastern Cape Premier and private business. and investigation on play Sarafina 2 are some of 
the cases which aroused doubts on the impartiality and reliability of the Public Protector's 
investigations. Investigations into these complaints created a perception that the Public 












3.5 HOW THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR MEASVRES PERFORMANCE 
3.5.1 N urn ber of Finalised Cases 
Finalised cases refers to complaints that the Public Protector makes a discretion to investigate 
and make a recommendation to a government department if there is need for recourse or 
advice the complainant that the complaint is not genuine. The determination here does not 
take into account whether the complainant is satisfied or the department responsible has 
taken corrective action. 
As per the Public Protector's annual reports. the office has norms (or serVIce delivery 
indicators) in place, indicating how many cases should be finalised in a given period. For 
instance. during the 2001102 reporting period, the office finalised 12 202 cases as against the 
planned 10869 cases, 1333 cases more than the set objective (Public Protector, 2001102:16). 
Thus according to this report, the office on a\erage performed 12% better than the 
predetermined objective set by the office. Howewl', the reports do not highlight what. the 
pre-determined objectives were. 
Similarly. as per the report of 2002/03. "" ... 21 000 complaints were completed and settled 
over the period under review, leaving only 7 000 complaints to be dealt with in the ensuring 
year" (Public Protector, 2002/03:11). As per the above report ..... excluding the North West 
Provincial office (due to a correction made on their statistics during the course of the 
year ... the office should have finalised 8 100 cases during the year under review) ... 
investigator" s managed 10 690 cases, 2 590 cases more than the set objective" (Public 










the pre-determined objective set for it. The above is suggestive of the fact that their 
performance is to a large extent measured in terms of the number of cases finalised at any 
given time. The use of statistics as a measure of performance is primarily an efficiency 
measure. but one that may be significant for the institution' s ability to achieve its objectives 
but does not shmv the impact that the Public Protector has on the complaints of citizens. 
3.5.2 Number of cases received 
The office of the Public Protector also use the increased usage and number of cases received 
to assess its effectiveness. Hence the assertion that. "the oftice has proven too much in 
demand by the public" (Public Protector. 1996a:2). This can be deduced from the words of 
the first Public Protector when he said: 
.. .I commend the founding fathers (and mothers) and all the people of 
South Africa for having insisted that an office of the Public Protector 
be established .. , the past seven years have more than justitied the need 
for its existence. With its existence the poor. the v,,'eak. the illiterate 
and the powerless have been enabled to obtain justice and 
administrative redress which they would otherwise not have obtained 
(sic) (Public Protector, 2001/02: 12). 
3.5.3 Reduced Backlog of cases 
Much of the Public Protector's annual reports are broken dovvn into three categories of 
classifications namely: received, brought forward and finalised cases. The purpose of the 
break down as for the first and last case has already been discussed above, The cases brought 











this is another measure of the office's performance as deduced from their annual reports. 
Hence they regard a reduced backlog of cases or cases brought forward as improved 
performance. The assertion below by the Public Protector confirms this position: 
A persistent problem however continues to bother me. in that the more and 
better we perform, the more the public utilises our services. Whilst this is a 
positive development in itself, and an indicator of the efficiency levels 
achieved by the office, the concomitant rise in backlog of old cases is not a 
welcome development" (Public Protector, 1998:9). 
3.5.4 Compliance 
Compliance by government departments against \vhom investigations are conducted is 
another measure of the office's effectiveness. A case by case analysis of the annual reports 
reveals that most of the specific cases included in the reports are those that the Public 
Protector had departments accepting and complying with their recommendations. Most of the 
cases captured in the reports as demonstration of the day to day cases that they get involved 
in are those that they successfully resolve. However. there is no section on the annual reports 
detailing recommendations that were complied with. The reports only reflect the findings and 
recommendations on a few chosen cases and does not state whether the recommendations 
were complied with. This is a missing link in their reporting system. 
3.6 STRENGTHS OF THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR' 











According to the Public Protector Report of 1996, funds for the expenditure connected to the 
office are provided for in the vote of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Justice, 
under a separate programme. As per the words of the Public Protector: 
It should be noted that this arrangement is an expedient one and does 
not imply that my funds are controlled by Justice ... r. and not the 
Director General of Justice,(sic) I am the Accounting Officer for this 
programme on the budget, and that I control my own budget. This is 
an important aspect regarding the office of the Public Protector as 
his/her independence is not a theoretical matter (Public Protcctor 
1996a: 16). 
Thus, the Public Protector's office claims to be financially independent in terms of having 
their specific budgets, and actually controlling their expenditure. 
3.6.2 Manner of appointment of the Public Protector and Removal from office 
The manner of appointing the Public Protector, as already indicated in section 3.3 above. 
secures the tenure of office of the incumbent. Hence the office could be said to enjoy some 
level of independence from the Executive or the Presidency. The appointment of a committee 
to deal with issues pertaining to the Public Protector as per section 2(2), which provides that 
'·the remuneration and other conditions of employment of the Public Protector shall from 
time to time be determined by the National Assembly upon the advice of the committee," is a 
\velcome provision. This is, to some extent, a measure that detaches the office from the 
Executive and links it to Parliament. Hence. the optimistic view that ·'the office enjoys some 
form of enhanced security of tenure and independence of the incumbency's office" (Public -











The existence of a Parliamentary Committee responsible for the Public Protector, alias, the 
Justice and Constitutional Development Committee. means that the Public Protector has the 
authority to approach it at any time. with regard to any matter pertaining to the office of the 
Public Protector (Public Protector. 1998: 12). Hence in the Public Protector's words, "this 
means that there is a 'permanent' committee and that reports. difficulties with resources. 
problems with the implementation of recommendations etc can be submitted to this 
committee"' (Public Protector. 1998: 12). The legal position is that this committee is 
responsible for monitoring the day to day activities of the Public Protector on behalf of the 
National Assembly. 
3.6.3 Accessibility 
To date the Public Protector has a national office and eight regional offices in the nme 
provinces. At the moment the national office of the Public Protector deals with provincial 
matters from Gauteng (Public Protector, 2001102: 54), The words of the Public Protector in 
the report's foreword, confirmed the increased accessibility and gro\\;th of size as captioned 
belovi: 
We have grown in size both in terms of the number of regional 
offices and staff." conducted a successful public awareness 
campaign throughout the nine provinces. We have assisted more 
people than ever regarding their complaints against the public 
administration ... more and more people are becoming aware of the 
services we render and are ever more grateful for thc assistance 
which comes at no cost to all the citizens of South Africa (Public 











The reports also allude to the fact that there are regional and satellite clinics where the office 
visits its clients. although these are not evenly distributed. This is confirmed by the Public 
Protector when he says that: 
As for the North West provll1ce. whilst this office is presently 
operating a number of clinics within the province. they are mainly 
in the central and eastern regions, and as there is a need for the 
western part of the province to be more accessible. Hence 
consideration is being given to the logistics to do so (Public 
Protector. 2001102:53). 
3.6.4 Public Awareness Campaigns 
The office of the Public Protector has with help and funding from the Lawyers for Human 
Rights, Royal Danish Embassy and the Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa 
conducted the first public awareness campaign throughout the nine provinces. Phase 1 of the 
campaign involved the development and production of training material and was conducted 
in 1999. Phase 2 involved the training of trainers knovm as National 'Train the Trainer" 
conducted on \6-17 February 2000 (Public Protector. 2000/01:67). Provincial Workshops 
were held targeting public service officials and paralegals. Phase 3 of the campaign involved 
the evaluation of the all the workshops by all the trainers. Fo\lO\ving the evaluation, a user 
friendly publication on functions and services of the office \vas produced and distributed 
effective November 2000 (Public Protector. 2000:67). 
A second three phase public education campaIgn was undertaken agal11 111 2002 (Public 
Protector. 2002/03:53). Training targeted the management echelons of the public sector, Non 











funded by the Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa. involved reprinting and 
updating existing 1999 training material. Phase two ,vas on training in all the provinces, and 
was funded by the Royal Danish Embassy. This \vas undertaken in April 2002. The 
evaluation of the workshops by trainers phase three of the campaign was conducted in 
November 2002 (Public Protector. 2002/03:53). 
From the study it is clear that the Public Protector's public education campaigns mostly 
targeted government officials and has not done same for the ordinary citizens who are 
supposed to be the prime targets. A rigorous campaign should target rural communities if 
they are to be made knowledgeabJe of the institution and to encourage its usage. 
3.6.5 Improved Reporting System 
The Public Protector's reporting style has gradually been improving, in line with the Public 
Protector Act of 1994, the Constitution of South Africa of 1996. and the Public Financial 
Management Act of 1998.The report is inclusive of their management report Auditor 
General's report, Financial Statement and Internal Audit Report as from 2001102 reporting 
period. As per the 2001102 report, "the office has implemented a risk identification and 
assessment as well as its fraud prevention plan.. outsourced the internal Audit illl1ction and 
the Audit Committee is well established and tlllly operational" (Public Protector. 
2001102 :54). Accordingly, "the office has implemented activities that promote corporate 
governance and improve financial management stich as installing an in-house financial 
information system for Financial Management to execute all financially related activities and 
Human Resources Management" (Public Protector. 2001/02:53-55). This is a welcome 











noteworthy to indicate that the Public Protector has a case management system that helps it 
to reconcile the number of cases received with the backlog of cases: cases brought forward 
and closed files for each year (Public Protector. 2002/03: 16). 
3.6.6 Cooperation 
Generally. "there has been an excellent cooperation of institutions" (Public Protector. 
1996a:3). The excellent cooperation of institutions has added benefit that a more informal 
approach to investigations could be followed. As per the 1996 annual report: 
Matters could be resolved over the telephone or at a meeting. or 
information could be gathered by writing to the institutions as opposed 
to summonsing witnesses and having formal hearings given under 
oath. This has resulted in the office being able to deal \vith complaints 
much quicker than it \vould have been able to do if a formal hearing 
had to be scheduled for every complaint (Public Protector. 1996(a):3). 
The K\vaZulu-Natal Province best illustrates the elicited cooperation. At its inception, it 
received an upsurge of cases. As per the Public Protector's words. 
The majority of complaints have been directed at the Department of 
Social Welfare and Population Development. National Treasury 111 
connection with social and government pensions; Department of 
Education and Culture: Department of Labour and its Compensation 
Fund has been the subjeet of general complaints (Public Protector. 
2001102: 18). 











This situation has changed since the regional office has established a 
good working relationship with the Department of Social Welfare and 
Population Development, as well as Treasury. Regrettably, the 
problems with the departments of Labour and Education continue ... 
Cooperation received has also improved at the Eastern Cape regional 
office although the number of complaints has been increasing; hence 
the number of letters of gratitude has also been growing steadily 
(Public Protector, 2001/02: 17 -18). 
3.7 0 PUBLIC PROTECTOR'S \VEAKNESSES 
3.7.1 Weak Performance Measurement Indicators 
There is no comprehensive set of performance measurement indicators developed by the 
institution to assess its own performance. It assesses its o\\n performance by looking at the 
number of cases it receives and completes or finalises. Although the otTice' s objectives are 
clear and well articulated, no effort has so far been made to translate them into measurable 
deliverables. The objectives have not been translated into clearly defined programmes or 
projects so that the impact of the institution could be measured. It would be expected that the 
office has a Strategic Plan against which its performance could be assessed. Although the 
Public Protector's objectives are included in all its annual reports. it is difficult to assess or 
determine whether or not they have been achieved in the absence of a strategic plan prior to 
2004. Hence during this period, there is no way one could tell hO\\ they performed without 
the necessary performance indicators. This position has been confirmed by the Public 
Protector when he said that "the office is in the process of developing new performance 











organisation." (Public Protector, 2002/03:59). Bv his admission. the Public Protector has 
submitted that: 
Not all set goals \vere achieved. Some goals \vere achieved after 
protracted delays of many form ... some departments and/or parastatals 
took time to respond to correspondence from our offices and 
cooperation was always not forthcoming (Public Protector, 
2002/03: 11). 
Although the office of the Public Protector was established in 1995. it only adopted a draft 
Strategic Plan in March 2004 (Parliament No. 98 - 2004: Report of the Portfolio Committee 
on lustice and Constitutional Development Hearings on Annual Reports and Strategic plans 
of Chapter 9 Institutions, 2004: 1093). According to the report. before then, it was not 
possible for the Portfolio Committee to assess the performance of the Office of the Public 
Protector. The Portfolio Committee has thus recommended that the strategic plans of these 
institutions "must indicate specific outputs in terms of specific projects that will be 
undertaken ... link it to specific activities which are measurable" (Parliament No. 98, 
2004: 1 095). 
It is for the above reasons that the Portfolio Committee had generally recommended that: 
The Annual Reports of Chapter 9 Institutions should in future include 
a report card against which the strategic plan for the financial year 
under review could be examined. In reference to strategic plans, each 
institution should indicate which objectives \vere met. \\hich were not 
met or which where partly met or on-going. This will allow the 
institutions to account in a more systematic \vay (Parliament No. 98, 










From the above. it is evident that the Public Protector has lagged behind in developing 
performance measurement indicators except to rely solely on looking at the number of cases 
received. number of cases finalised. backlog of cases. without first having identified inputs, 
output target indicators and linking them to the set objectives. 
3.7.2 \Veak Annual Reporting Accountability Mechanism 
In terms of Section J 81 (5) of the constitution. "state institutions supporting constitutional 
democracy are accountable to the National Assembly and must report on their activities and 
the performance of their functions to the National Assembly at least once a year". To ensure 
accountability in the South African government, seyeral institutional arrangements have been 
provided for in legislation, one of which is that Heads of Department must prepare annual 
reports to the Legislature that fairly presents their actual periormance against predetermined 
objectives and financial position. Besides. the Public Financial Ylanagement Act of 1999 
section 40( 1 ) (b) and (d) provides that: "The Accounting Officer must prepare financial 
statements for each financial year in accordance \\'ith generally recognised accounting 
practice: and must submit an annual report on the activities of the department during that 
financial year". Section 40(3) (a) further requires that .. the annual report and audited financial 
statements must fairly present; the state of affairs in the department; its business; its financial 
results; its performance against predetermined objectives; and its financial position as at the 
end of the financial year concerned". 
Although South Africa is well endowed with a variety of accountability mechanisms, in the 
10rm of Acts. financial regulations and general management policies in place. it seems there 











and Accountability (1999) and the Public Service Commission (PSC) (1999) have observed 
that generally, South African institutions have poor annual reporting mechanisms. The 
Corder Report (1999) observes that: 
While it would appear that written reports would seem to be a valuable 
vehicle to explain Executive activity to Parliamentary Committees and 
a useful tool for the committees in the exercise of their oversight 
function, this has not yet been the case. While they may provide a 
comprehensive overview of a departmenfs activity for the past year, 
there is often too much information to be useful - at the same time 
fairly topical and therefore providing too little information in areas that 
are important for effective oversight to take place (Corder, 1999:35-
36). 
The Corder report further submits that: 
Evidence on committee responses to written reports, as recorded by the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) or through Committee reports 
to Parliament ... highlight the problems many of these reports 
contain". While many annual reports and budget presentations can be 
quite lengthy, a common complaint of MPs' is that crucial information 
is either missing or obscured (Corder, 1999:36) 
The Public Protector's reports are no exception in this regard. 
Lending credence to the above observations is the Public Service Commission study of 1999. 












Departments largely report on their activities - what they have done 
during the year- and that this was mostly limited to a description of the 
achievements and the benefits of programmes, or progress with 
implementation of programmes ... Many departments failed to make the 
link or even attempted to report on outputs in their annual reports 
output was not linked to inputs, departmental objectives and the targets 
(PSC 1999:50). 
Besides. the PSC observed that: 
Increases or decreases were not explained and analysed. No 
quantity. quality or timeous performance indicators were 
reported on. This made it almost impossible to ma]"e 
informed judgement on the performance of a department 
( 1999:50). 
It is in this light, that the Corder report (1999) and the Public Service Commission (1999) 
reports recommended amongst other things, measures to improve the reporting standards, the 
development of performance criteria and standardised formats for reporting. The PSC has also 
stressed that , .... performance data provided in annual reports should be useful to the person 
\,.,-ho has to assess that performance ... this information should include quantified. compared 
and verifiable performance data" (PSC 1999:42). As a result of the lack of clarity in the 
annual reporting system, the Public Service Commission "recommends that for departments to 
be able to report intelligently and systematically on performance instead of just on their 
acti vities, supporting, monitoring and evaluation systems and information systems are a 
prerequisite" (PSC 1999:44). 
It has also been noted that lack of debate on annual reports 111 Parliament and in the 










According to Corder (1999:37), there is no procedure for committees to address or respond to 
written reports. Parliamentary Committees are not required to do anything when they receive a 
submission. Besides, there is no obligation for Parliamentary Committees and Executive 
officials to hold a briefing or to arrange a response. This obviously means that reports are not 
subjected to internal debate (Corder, (1999:38). Hence it is dit1icult to follow-up committee 
matters or reports Corder (1999:38). As per the Corder report in their submissions to the 
consultants. "many constitutional institutions han.: pointcd out that due to the workload of 
these committees there is no tangible or visible follO\v-up of the matters raised or the 
recommendations which are made in reports"(Corder. 1999:59). 
3.7.3 Limited independence 
Contrary to a view held by the Public Protector that the office is independent, this assertion has 
practical limitations. The independence of these institutions must be seen in relation to their 
position vis-a.-vis the Executive branch of government. According to Corder (1999:56): 
It has two facets; in the first place. to make institutions dependent on 
budget allocations received from the very departments that they are 
required to monitor is not desirable. Secondly. these institutions must 
be seen by the public to be independent and free of the possibility of 
influence or pressure by the Executive branch of the government. 
Approval by the Executives of budgets. or other issues such as 
staffing, is thus inconsistent with independence as well as the need to 
be perceived as independent by the public \\-hen dealing with their 
cases. The Executive power could render impotent state institutions 
supporting constitutional democracy through potential denial of both 











Owing to the limited accountability and independence of constitutional institutions, the 
Corder report recommends that "their accountability and independence should be served and 
outlined under a separate legislation, the Accountability Standards Act and an Accountability 
and Independence of Constitutional Institutions Ace (Corder, 1999:61-64). The report 
proposes that this would achieve the required financial and administrative independence. As 
for finaneial independence, "it was proposed that either the institutions should each have its 
vote individually or a separate vote for all the institutions as a group" (Corder, 1999:60). 
Preference is however given to the first option as it enhances independence even amongst the 
institutions themselves. 
As for administrative independence, the report recommends that a provision should be made 
for Parliament through its relevant committees, to exercise a supportive. supplementary and 
monitoring role for constitutional institutions (Corder, 1999:61). In this light, the Corder report 
recommends "the establishment of a Standing Committee on Constitutional Institutions" 
(Corder. 1999:61). It can thus be argued that should such an arrangement be made, the 
institution \vill achieve some level of independence. accountable reporting. follow-ups on 
matters and ensuring compliance with recommendations, hence an improvement on the 
institution's performance. The report proposes further that these recommendations will ..... 
enhance the authority of Parliament to hold the Executive accountable to the people as well as 
to give full effect to the independence, impartiality and credibility of constitutional 
institutions" (Corder, 1999:63). It should also be noted that the Ad Hoc Joint Sub- Committee 
on Oversight and Accountability (2002), accepted most of the recommendations of the report 
in principle, but that the government or Parliament has not legally acted to address or effect 











3.7.4 Resource Constraints 
The Public Protector's office, just like any other government institution. has financial and 
human resource problems. It has become common knowledge that for organisations to 
achieve their goals and objectives. and hence have a meaningful impact. they need to have 
the necessary resources to do that. In the Public Protector's O\\/n words, " ... Although 
Parliament and the Department of State Expenditure are continuing to assist us in accessing 
more resources. \\e are still not out of the woods in this regard" (Public Protector .. 
'-
2002/03: 11 ). 
The Public Protector further submitted that this state of affairs is not always understood by 
the public that is served; hence it continues to be a cause for concern (Public Protector. 
2002/03: 11). Lack of sufficient resources prevented investigators from conducting some in 
loco investigations. hence hindering quick settlement of complaints (Public Protector. 
2002/03: 11). The office does not have enough personnel either. This is further compounded 
by the fact that "it is a lengthy process to establish a proven necessity for further posts, to 
consult in terms of the relevant legislation. and to advertise posts and screen applications" 
(Public Protector,2002/03: 11. The result is that a backlog of cases builds up. (Public 
Protector. 1996a:3). The Public Protector reiterates this position when he says: 
A persistent problem however continues to bother me. in that the more 
and better we perform. the more the public utilises our services. 
Whilst this is a positive development in itself and an indicator of the 
efficiency levels achieved by the office. the concomitant rise in 












The lack of capacity to handle complaints, and accessibility. are key issues that need to be 
addressed in order to ensure not only the credibility. but also the continued effective delivery 
by the ottice (Public Protector, 1998:9). The combination of limited funds, rise in 
complaints, and lengthy investigations resulted in staff being under severe pressure to cope 
with the workload (Public Protector, 1999: 11). 
3.7.5 Political Party Image Serving and Protection 
There have been numerous criticisms of the Public Protector's ottice regarding its seemingly 
inherent tendency to serve the ruling political party's image and politicians. The appointment 
of the Public Protector is seen by some as politicaL This seems to stem from the fact that the 
current Public Protector's profile (Public Protector, 2002/03:9) indicates that prior to his 
appointment as Public Protector he was a Member of Parliament for the ruling party and 
Deputy Speaker of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). having won his seat by virtue 
of being a member of the African National Congress (ANC). As a matter of logic, it therefore 
follows that it could be argued that he is a political appointee. even if his appointment was as 
per a recommendation from the National Assembly. in vvhich the ANC has majority, and also 
has the president of the ANC as state president. This proposition confirms the perception that 
the Public Protector in South Africa is a political appointee. It is this perception that made the 
Public Protector's report on the 'oilgate scandal' to be labelled a 'white wash' (Mail & 
Guardian, 4 August 2005) by ANC opponents and the media. This article has further 
submitted that the Public Protector's report "disregarded the most important issues. cleared 
government and its functionaries of remaining allegations on t1imsiest of grounds." 
Substantively, the Public Protector "disregarded the onward payment to the ANC, saying it 











investigate public matters only .... he excised any possibility of the abuse of power" (Mail & 
Guardian. 4 August 2005). It therefore follows from the above observation that the Public 
Protector's independence is in question, since he could do anything in his powers to protect 
the image of his party, which apparently is in power. 
In response to a report by the Public Protector on Dr. Goqwana' s Private interests and into 
his appointment as Health MEC by Eastern Cape Premier Stofile, the Public Service 
Accountability Monitor (PSAM) an independent corruption monitoring unit. submitted that 
the rep0l1 represents "an abrogation of the responsibilities of the Public Protector and a 
betrayal of his constitutionally mandate to defend democracy and the public interest, as 
opposed to protecting the image of the executive" (PSAM, 2002a:4). lIenee PSAM declared 
the Public Protector's report that cleared Dr Goqvvana following revelations of his substantial 
business interests in the Eastern Cape Provincial Health Sector a "white wash"(Pambazuka 
News. 3 October 2002). The report was dismissed as a "whitewash" because it vindicated 
Premier Stofile and Dr Goqwana of wrongdoing as a result of a shoddy investigation by the 
Public Protector (PSAM. 2002b: 1), 
As for the oilgate scandal, Bullard (2005), called for the abolition of the office, as he 
believed that the Public Protector chose to ignore real issues in the investigation, Bullard 
further submitted that "to suggest that Mushwana is lacking in vertebrae or that he 
deliberately chose to ignore salient features of Imvume/PetroSA deal is to suggest that he did 
not understand the role of the Public Protector", Accordingly_ the writer submitted that "he 
understood his role too well and never had any intention of doing anything other than serving 
his political masters", As a result of the above concerns, there is a growing perception that 
the Public Protector interpreted his jurisdiction too narrowly and therefore absolving himself 











Imvume (PTY) LTD. February (2005) observes that "an expanSIve interpretation of his 
mandate would certainly have allowed the Public Protector to follow the money trail and get 
to the crux of the allegations". The Public Protector has instead. chose to pay lip service and 
allowed public money to be siphoned out to a political party through some unscrupulous 
tender obligations in the disguise of promoting Black Economic Empowerment policies 
without the money transfer being satisfactorily accounted for. 
Similarly. investigation of the Play SaraEna II Special Report No.1 of 20 May 1996 also 
raises eyebrows. The manner. in which tendering procedures. regulations were handled, was 
in the words of the Public Protector "completely tlawed and defective" (Public Protector 
Special Report No.1 of 1994:22). Despite these findings. the recommendations of the Public 
Protector did not make anyone take responsibility. Besides. the investigations side-stepped 
the minister Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's responsibility but instead focllsed attention only 
on the tendering process. 
President Mandela and other ministers seemed content with the issue of Dr Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma's mismanagement, and her lack of public and parliamentary accountability. 
was ignored by herself and her colleagues (Good. 2004:82). According to the Mail & 
Guardian (2005:2), the former Public Protector Selby Baqvva stopped short of probing too 
deeply the role of the then Minister of Health Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in promoting the 
t1aw'ed Aids-uvvareness play. The then Water Affairs Minister. Kader Asmal endorsed her 
cringingly as a 'talented" and 'a fine and principled minister'. while the then Vice President 
Mbeki expressed the government's full confidence (Business Day 1996 cited in Good. 
2004:82). Hence Good has posited that ministerial responsibility \\as side-stepped. As for 











minister, and announced firmly that the Sarafina II saga was closed forever" (Business Day 
1996 cited in Good, 2004:82) despite calls that the minister should do the honourable thing, 
and resign from cabinet. She was supported and cushioned from within government and the 
ruling African National Congress CANC). 
From the above, it can be argued that perhaps sen'ing political party image together with its 
leaders or members is an 'unwritten objective' of the Public Protector's office whose 
performance indicator could equally be serving party interests and maintained grip on 
political power. Thus it can be argued fut1her that. the office holders' service is at the 
pleasure of the Executive that appoints him/her, and their service will always be needed and 
guaranteed only if they do so at the pleasure and support of the ruling party. This could 
perhaps be the reason why the office developed cold feet in recommending that the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NP A) should investigate how public funds ended up into an ANC 
bank account via Imvume since by implication there were some criminal activities involved, 
hence the party had to be exonerated or protected. Justice \vas not delivered as the Public 
Protector rested his case by saying: 
The mandate of the Public Protector is by law restricted to the 
investigation of matters relating to government bodies. public entities. 
state affairs and dishonesty in respect of publ ic money." allegations 
pertaining to the relationship between Imvume and the Al\C. 
payments made by Imvume to the ANC and private entities and the 
involvement of the ANC ... could not be investigated ... (Public 
Protector. 2005:7). 
This was further supported by statements from the cabinet when the government 











Public Protector's Lawrence Mushwana report" (Mail &Guardian SAugust 2005: I). He 
further said that "vvhile government had always understood that allegations of improper 
conduct on the part of state officials were unfounded, we do appreciate that this matter. as it 
relates to government has been laid to rest"(Mail &Guardian. S August 2005:1). 
A genuine claim can thus be made that the Public Protector in South Africa is not only an 
adjunct of the Executive but also by extension serving political party interests due to the 
political connections inherent between the office holder and the political party in power. 
3.7.6 Non-Compliant and Uncooperative State Institutions 
Although the office has generally received cooperation and compliance from most state 
institutions. cooperation from some of these institutions has not been forthcoming. As per the 
Public Protector's words: 
It should be mentioned here that certain problems were experienced in 
certain provinces, no doubt due to the amalgamation of the various 
former governments into new provincial governments. Notably in 
Eastern Cape. we had most unsatisfactory responses to certain of my 
queries and only received cooperation after threatening to issue 
summonses (Public Protector. 1996a:3). 
The Public Protector's report on an investigation of a complaint by the Vice President Jacob 
Zuma against the National Director of Public Prosecutions and the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA) in connection with a criminal imestigation conducted against him is an 
important case involving serious breach of corporate governance. This case is an important 











and thus hindering the fulfilment of their obligations. It transpired during the investigations 
follo~ing Arms deal corruption allegations against Zuma that the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the National Prosecuting Authority \"ere not willing to assist the Public 
Protector to objectively address the complaint from Mr Zuma. 
As the Public Protector indicated in his report: 
The investigation on the complaint by the Deputy President could only 
be conducted with the assistance of the National Director and the 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (minister) ... in 
compliance with the provisions of section 41 (1) (g) of the constitution 
which provides that all spheres of government and all organs of state 
within each sphere must cooperate with one another in mutual trust 
and good faith by assisting and supporting one another (Public 
Protector. 2004:50). 
Despite these guarantees and obligations, cooperation with the NPA and the minister 
responsible could not be obtained In this matter despite numerous requests by 
correspondences and verbal meetings. The investigation reached a stalemate that stalled 
further determination of the case. until intervention was sought from the State President. 
Hmvever. the response received after this intenention has been described by the Public 
Protector as: 
Phrased in an aggreSSIve and defensive manner and providing no 
assistance to the Public Protector. as is required by law; insulted the 
Public Protector by insinuating that he is a liar and incompetent; and 
created the impression that the Prosecuting Authority regards itself as 











The lack of cooperation by high profile institutions such as the NPA that are similarly 
constituted in terms of independence and reporting mechanisms is unhealthy and does not 
enhance constitutional democracy as enshrined in the constitution' s bill of rights. The conduct 
of the NP A and its ofIicials, and the minister in particular. has to a large extent created and 
supported the perception that certain institutions and individuals are beyond reproach. hence 
by implication the application of double standards. The reluctance and failure by the minister 
and the National Director to cooperate with the Public Protector in the investigation was 
improper and unconstitutional. It resulted in the Public Protector having to conclude the 
investigation without the benefit of proper responses by those implicated by the complaints of 
the Deputy President (Public Protector, 2004:91-92). 
In such circumstances, the Public Protector's office finds itself helpless and unable to deliver 
on its mandate as prescribed by the constitution and the Public Protector Act. 1994. Hence this 
has a debilitating effect on the performance of the institution. As submitted in the report, "the 
NPA felt that the investigation by the Public Protector \vas as an illegal attempt to review the 
decision not to prosecute the Deputy President"' (Public Protector. 2004:64) on allegations of 
involvement in the Arms Deal corruption charges. The case also confirms the conflicting and 
confusing jurisdiction of government institutions that sometimes hinder the attainment of 
noble objectives. The Public Protector has equally noted this observation when he submitted 
that "the response from the National Director and minister clearly indicated a lack of 
understanding of constitutional mandate and the role and function of the Public Protector" 











4.0 CHAPTER FOUR 
THE BOTSWANA OMBUDSMAN 
4.1.1 Background and Rationale for the institution 
In 1981. the Botswana government as a result of pressure from politicians from across the 
political diyide and private media reports on corruption by government officials "saw the 
need to examine the role that could be played by an Ombudsman in her set-up" (Ngwako. 
1996:87). According to Ngwako: 
The Botswana constitution, like those of most countries 111 the 
Commomvealth. contains what may be termed a justifiable bill of 
human rights. which are centre stage in any democratic dispensation. 
In addition. common law and other statutes proyide further and 
concurrent protection of the rights of indiyiduals. These constitutional 
and other protections notwithstanding. the office or institution of the 
Ombudsman was thought to be relevant and playing a significant part 
in the quest for good governance and transparency (1996:87). 
The desire for having an Ombudsman in Botswana was thus goaded by the need to promote 
democracy and good governance. The establishment of this office. as viewed by Ngwako 
was "to make institutions more transparent and accountable" (Ngwako, 1996:87). It should 
be noted that although the commissions of inquiries did a good job in investigating instances 
of corruption and/or maladministration before establishment of the Ombudsman, they were 
ad hoc and were also not an efficient tool for good governance. The most viable option, it 
could be inferred was to establish a permanent structure like the Ombudsman to complement, 











normal courts and departmental appeal committees. and supplement the traditional 
parliamentary accountability and oversight roles. 
Various studies were undertaken by the government culminating in an international seminar 
in Botswana in 1993 on 'The feasibility of the Ombudsman institution in Botswana' 
(Hansard No. 116 of 1995 cited in Fombad (2001:58). As mentioned earlier. the corruption 
scandals of the 1990's provided fertile ground for the government to embrace the 
Ombudsman concept and establish this institution. 
The Ombudsman ofTice in Botswana was established through an Act of Parliament. the 
Ombudsman Act of 1995. and started operating in September 1997. Promulgation of the Act 
was precipitated by a series of corruption and mismanagement scandals in the 1990' s (Good, 
1994:500; Modisi. 1996:10; Fombad, 2001:59). Most notably as Modisi (1996:10) puts it, 
"were the commissions of inquiry into the supply of books by a company called IPM, 
operations of the Botswana Housing Corporation and plot allocations in Mogoditshane". 
These revelations "led to court cases against the culprits. forced retirements, dismissals and 
resignation of senior civil servants. parastatal executi\es and ministers (Modisi 1996: 1 0). 
These acts invariably. tarnished the efficient and corruption-free image of the civil service in 
Botswana. It became apparent that. "the country's economic growth provided innumerable 
opportunities for corruption and influence peddling"' (Fombad. 2001:58). According to 
Fombad: 
The scandals revealed the limitations of the existing institutions. The 
liberal multi-party system, dominated as it is by a single party did not 











relative independent and ef1icient judicial system was unable to check 
the abuses (2001 :58). 
As a result. the government was "pressured to follow the examples of other states in the 
region and introduce institutions such as the Ombudsman. which could counter these abuses" 
(Hansard No. 116 of 1995 cited in Fombad. 200 l: 58). 
It is worth noting that over the past years. "Bots\vana made strides to promote the 
institutionalisation of good governance and democracy" (Molomo. 1998:200). Molomo 
argues that. "with other democracies, including developed ones: the project of democracy in 
Botswana can best be informed by the assertion that democracy is not absolute but rather an 
ever-evolving process that needs to be nurtured and constantly refined". Hence Post-
independent Botswana has been characterised by the establishment of independent quasi-
judicial oversight institutions to provide oversight. 'checks and balances' mechanisms on the 
use of Executive authority and power. These institutions were put in place mainly to create 
permanent oversight on activities and/or conduct of government institutions' use of power. 
These institutions include the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), the 
Industrial Court. Land Tribunal, Independent Electoral Commission (lEC). Auditor General, 
Parliamentary Accounts Committee and the Ombudsman. These institutions, the 
Commonwealth Business Council observes: 
Play an important role in conducting independent audits and studies 
that provide objective information. achice. and assurance to 
Parliament government. and ordinary citizens on hO\v effectively 
government is functioning. The Ombudsman. m particular as a 
protector of public interest, IS an appropriate authority to 
receive/respond to reports of maladministration (Commomvealth 












The main functions of the Ombudsman are set out in Section 3( 1) of the Ombudsman Act, 
1994 and are as follows: 
The Ombudsman may investigate any action taken by or on behalf of a 
government department or other authority to which this act applies, 
being action taken in the exercise of administrative functions of that 
department or authority in any case where a) a complaint is made to 
the Ombudsman by a member of the public who claims to have 
sustained injustice in consequence of maladministration in connection 
with action so taken; b) the complaint is referred to the Ombudsman, 
with the consent of the person who made it by the President, a 
minister or any member of the National Assembly ·with a request to 
conduct an investigation thereon; c) in any of the circumstances in 
which the Ombudsman on his own motion considers it necessary to 
investigate the action on the ground that some person bas or may have 
sustained some injustice. 
In terms of Section 3(3) of the Ombudsman Act .. the Ombudsman also has 
jurisdiction to investigate matters relating to contravention of the provisions for the 
protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms". 
4.1.3 Manner of appointment 
As per Section 2(2) of the Ombudsman Act "the Ombudsman shall be appointed by 
the President in consultation with the leader or the Opposition in the National 
Assembly". Section 2(3), however precludes appointment of certain people to the 











Ombudsman if he is a member of the National Assembly, a member of any local 
authority, a candidate for election as a member of the National Assembly or a local 
authority nominated as such with his consenC. During his/her tenure of office, as per 
Section 2(4), "the Ombudsman shall not perform the functions of any other public 
office, and shall noL without approval of the President in each particular case, hold 
any other emolument other than the office of the Ombudsman or engage in any 
occupation for reward outside of his office". This. it is believed. is to ensure that there 
are no chances of conflict of interest in the discharge of his/her personal vis-it-vis his 
official duties. 
As per Section 2(5) of the Ombudsman Act "a person holding such office shall vacate 
that office at the expiration of four years from tht: datt: of his employment". The 
removal of the incumbent from office as stipulated in Section 2( 6) of the above Act is 
similar to that obtaining for High Court Judges under Section 97(5) of the Constitution 
of Bots\:vana. As per Section 97(5) of the Constitution of Botswana. "if the President 
ft:els that a high COUlt judge ought to be removed from oflice. he can institute a 
tribunal to investigate the matter and act on the basis of their recommendation". As per 
Section 97(2) of the Constitution, "a judge of the High Court may be removed from 
office only for inability to perform the functions of his of1ice (whether arising from 
infirmity ot~ body or mind or from any other cause) for misbehaviour. and shall not be 
removed except in accordance with the above provisions)." 
All in aIL it is the President who has authority on suspending or removing the 
Ombudsman from office based on advice from the tribunal. hence the removal from 











the leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly as the process of appointment 
does, 
4.1.4 Independence of the Ombudsman 
The Ombudsman is an independent and autonomous institution. In accordance with 
Section 9( 1) of the Ombudsman Act. "in the discharge of his fUllctions, the 
Ombudsman shall not be subject to the direction or eontrol of any other person or 
authority and no proceedings of the Ombudsman shall be called into question in any 
court of la\y," The institution submits its reports to the President and not to the 
National Assembly. as it is normally the case in other parliamentary democracies, As 
per Section 9(2). "The Ombudsman shall make an annual report to the President 
concerning the discharge of his functions, which shall be laid before the National 
Assembly", 
4.1.5 Mission Statement 
As per the Ombudsman report of 1997/98 the otfice of the Ombudsman pledges to: 
- Investigate all matters of complail11s within our jurisdiction 
irrespective of complainant's colour, creed. tribe, ongll1 or sexual 
orientation: 
Inyestigate independently, impartially. objectively and without fear 
and favour: 
-Make ourselves accessible to resolve complaints speedily. and to 











-Ensure the highest levels of professionalism and contribute to 
promoting good governance, accountability and transparency in the 
public sector; 
-Serve all communities to the best of ability: 
-Remain acutely aware that the ombudsman is neither an agent of 
government or its agencies nor an agent of the complainant 
(Ombudsman, 1997/98: 1). 
The office's latest mission states that the "otlice of the Ombudsman aims to protect 
members of the public against acts of maladministration in the public sector. promote 
and advocate for the upliftment of human rights in an independent and impartial 
manner" (Ombudsman, 2003/04:2). 
4.2 How the Ombudsman Measures its I)erformance 
At this point ll1 time the office does not han: objective and comprehensive 
performance measurement indicators. although it has a clear vision, mission statement 
and values. The Performance Management System (PMS) a public service initiative or 
reform \vas only started in 2001102. Specifically, as per the words of the Ombudsman: 
The ot1ice recently kick-started (sic) PMS internal awareness 
workshop with the aim of establishing a strategic plan .... The office is 
possibly one of the last public institutions to initiate this programme 
(Ombudsman. 2001102:3). 
In justifying this position, the Ombudsman in this report explained. that: 
This process is only being initiated presently for the reason that it was 
necessary that ample opportunity was created for us to learn how the 











effectively place strategies that complement and enhance our ability to 
deal with it. .. it would have been an exercise in futility. to put in place 
a strategic plan without familiarising the office with how the public 
serviee operates (Ombudsman. 2002/03:3). 
The institution is still to have a strategic plan. This is eonfirmed in the Ombudsman 
report of 2003/04, which says: 
In this reporting year, my staff and I together \\ith Botsvvana National 
Productivity Centre consultants spent countless man-hours in retreats 
for the preparation of our Strategic Plan (Ombudsman.2003/04;5). 
HO\veveL it is discernible from the reports that the ratio of investigators to cases. 
caseload or the number of cases received and number of those that are closed or 
finalised are used to gauge the performance of the institution. 
"'.2.1 ~umber of cases or complaints received 
This is captured in the words of the Ombudsman \vhen he submits that: 
The reporting year has seen the office of the Ombudsman being greeted 
with even greater enthusiasm from the two previous years. Testimony to 
this is borne from the faet that eomplaints received have increased by 
almost a hundred per cent (l 00%) from the previous year. It is indeed a 











increasingly. It is in the light of that position that \\e have submitted a 
request to appropriate authorities for a substantial increase of staff 
(Ombudsman, 2000: 3). 
4.2.2 Ratio of investigators to number of cases handled 
The Ombudsman report of 2001102:6 indicates that its ratio is 1:300 as opposed to 1:16 
for the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) in 2001. This therefore 
was meant to draw attention to the fact that the office is thin on the ground as compared 
to similar institutions, and therefore considerable increase in the workload presently in 
excess of 300 per investigator. In his words, the Ombudsman submitted that "this 
increase has unfortunately not been met by a proportionate increase in our statT despite 
requests for additional manpower" (Ombudsman, 2001102:6). 
In substantiating high ratio as a mcasure of performance in relation to manpower 
constraints, the report further captures the following words by the Ombudsman: 
I have as a result suspended the establishment of branch offices at 
PaJapye and Kanye as previously proposed ... the FrancistO\vn office 
remains albeit under serious manpower and other related constraints. 
(Ombudsman, 2001/02:6). 











The ability of the office to secure compliance with its recommendations is another 
indicator that continues to be used to measure the otlice' s performance. This is 
confirmed in the Ombudsman's words when he sms: 
Happily, compliance rate by the public ser\'lce with our 
recommendations is exceptional and indeed is not only a measure of 
our success but also a reflection of our increased acceptability to the 
public service (Ombudsman, 2003/04:5). 
A case-by-case analysis of the annual reports reveals that most of the specific cases included 
in the reports are those that they had departments accepting and complying with their 
recommendations. There are of course few exceptions to this rule. Most of the cases captured 
in the reports as demonstration of the day-to-day cases that they get involved in, are those 
that they successfully resolved. There is however no demonstrative evidence from the reports 
to indicate \vhether or not recommendations for specific cases as captured in the reports were 
complied vvith. Hence compliance as a measure of performance is not substantively qualified 
and adequately reported on. 
4.3.0 OMBUDSMAN STRENGTHS 
4.3.1 Re-structuring Exercise 
A promising development however, is the restructuring exercise that the office is currently 
undergoing. As per the 2003/04 report, "the Directorate of Public Service Management has 
been involved in a restructuring analysis of the office, the report of which is still being 
discussed vvith the Ministry of Presidential An~lirs and Public Administration before 











would help streamline and rationalise its activities so as to retlect its manpower needs and 
priorities. The report, does not however, briefly describe what the re-structuring exercise 
entails. Hence this is a shortfall in the reporting style. 
4.3.2 Installation of Case Management System 
This involves a shift from the traditional and manual system of data management to a 
computerised system. The computerisation of cases as per the words of the Ombudsman 
"'enhances efficiency levels", (Ombudsman, 2003!O .. L6) in terms of making the management 
of statistics reliable, and. making the status of individually cases accessibh: through the touch 
or click of a button. The Gaborone-based national office has installed the system. The 
Ombudsman has submitted that: 
Given that our core business is investigation. it is paramount that our 
data base should not only be stored effectively for utilisation but 
should also be available at the touch of a button (Ombudsman2003/04: 
6). 
4.3.3 Public Awareness Campaigns 
Public campaign avvareness have taken the form of several radio talk show programmes, 
appearances on national television as well as distribution and mounting of posters on public 
offices' notice boards on core business activities of the office (Ombudsman. 2003/04:6). 











As per the words of the Ombudsman, " ... compliance rate by the public service with our 
recommendations is exceptional, and indeed is not only a measure of our success but also a 
reflection of our increased acceptability to the public sen ice (Ombudsman. 2003/04:5). 
4.4.0 OMBUDSMAN'S WEAKNESSES 
4...1.. t \Veak Performance Indicators/Measures 
There are no comprehensive performance measurement indicators developed by the 
institution to assess its own performance except for gauging themselves by looking at the 
number of cases they receive and complete or finalise. Although the office' s objectives are 
clear and \vell articulated. no effort has so far been made to translate them into measurable 
deliverables. The objectives have not been translated into programmes or projects. It would 
be expected that the office has a Strategic Plan against which its performance could be 
assessed. Although the Ombudsman objectives are included in all its annual reports. it is 
difficult to assess or determine whether or not they ha\'e been achieved in the absence of a 
Strategic Plan. Hence, during this period there is no \\ay one could objectively tell how they 
have performed without the necessary Strategic Plan linked to performance indicators. The 
reports do not indicate whether or not its objectives hme been achieved or not. It appears the 
Ombudsman is greatly challenged in coming up with an objecti,e criteria of evaluating its 
actual performance against pre-determined objectives 
The lack of comprehensive performance measures and indicators leaves people with nothing 
but to speculate on the office's performance. This is further complicated by the quality of 
reporting that has so far been in use. Although the reporting reflects the number of eases 











financial management system, audit reports. auditing risk management policies. financial 
statements and human resources management systems. Their finances need to be audited by 
independent auditors as required by Section 124 of the Constitution of Botswana. It is in this 
light that the Ombudsman in his words. has submitted that "the institutions's books of 
accounts should be audited by certified public accountants and be subject to inspection by the 
Auditor General" (Ombudsman, 1997/98:7). The reports do not give a reasoned account of 
\vhich objectives they have achieved and the ones not achieved and why. 
The use of statistics has its own limitations. For instance it is not very informative to know 
the number of cases received without indicating the impact of the institution on individuals' 
complaints. The use of compliance as a measure of performance is also problematic because 
it is not succinctly defined nor is there a brief of ho\\ it is objectively measured to those who 
are outside the Ombudsman institution. 
4.4.2 Limited independence 
Many scholars (Lebotse, 1999: Ayeni & Sharma, 2000: Fombad, 20(1) and the first 
Ombudsman have questioned the independence of the Ombudsman office. The independence 
of the office in the two main aspects namely; operational and financial independence, is 
questionable. As for financial independence, it does not haw the authority to determine its 
financial needs in line with its priorities without submitting a request to Parliament through 
the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration. Experience has shown that 
although the institution prepares its annual estimates. it does not have a stand-alone budget 











fall \vithin the ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration for the limited 
funds that government can allocate each time depending on the annual financial ceilings. 
It is also apparent that the office lacks the much-needed functional or operational 
independence from the Executive and government departments beeause it does not employ 
its own staff but instead relies on public officials from other government depal1ments. 
Besides, these officers are governed by the same Public Service Act like any other 
government employee v..'ith same conditions of 'Nark and remuneration, Hence there is call to 
amend the Act to make the office a juristic person. This will gi\'e the Omhudsman authority 
to employ its own staff separate from the general puhlic officers. It will also have autonomy 
in terms of recruitment criteria, terms of work and remuneration. The making of this ot1ice, a 
"legal person employing its staff, preparing the necessary structures for promotions and 
progression can only serve, as it must, to enhance the independence of the office" 
(Ombudsman. 1999:4). Currently the office relies on staff seconded from other departments 
through the Department of Public Service Management the gowrnmenh:mploying agency. 
This office needs to be established outside of the puhlic service to make it independent of any 
other government ministry (Omhudsman 1999:3), The report further reiterates that. "neither 
the Ombudsman nor any member of staff should he in competition for a higher post in the 
normal government promotional hierarchy" (Omhudsman. 1999:3 ).It is in light of the above 
experiences that the Ombudsman has submitted that: 
There is indeed in my respectful submission. a manifest conflict of 
interest where either the Ombudsman or inwstigator investigates an 
officer or department when he/she may aspire for a higher post in that 











It has since been suggested that the act be amended ·with the \iew of making the office 
independent in the true sense of the word. In this regard. the Ombudsman has thus submitted 
that: 
In order to put this independence into a correct perspective. the 
Ombudsman Aet must be amended to make the institution a juristic 
person. It is important in my view that the independence of the office 
be clearly demonstrated in the statutory basis on 'vvhich it is established 
(Ombudsman. 1997/98:7). 
The proposed amendment, it is submitted. will be in-keeping with the spirit and the intention 
of Section 9(1) of the Ombudsman Act which provides that "in the discharge of his 
functions the Ombudsman shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or 
authori ty ..... 
The independence of the institution and its functional efficacy would be ensured by 
"providing it with financial autonomy" (Fombad. 20-01 :63). In this regard. Fombad posits 
that this should clearly be spelt out either in the constitution or an Act of Parliament rather 
than through ministerial regulations, which may be used to interfere with the functioning of 
the office. 
4.4.3 Reservations on Manner of Appointment and Tenure of Office 
The appointment of the Ombudsman by the President makes his independence not only 
doubtful but raIses suspicion that the appointment \vas informed more by political 
consideration than merit (Lebotse. 1999:67-68). As already alluded to. the incumbent is 
appointed by the President in consultation with the Leader of the opposition in the National 











consultation is not defined by the Act an omission that often simply facilitates a presidential 
appointment (Fombad, 2001:62). This is open to abuse since it could facilitate an appointment 
based on political patronage. 
As Fombad (2001:62) and Lebotse (199967-68) have observed. the independence of the office 
is further compromised by Section 2(4), which states that 
The Ombudsman shall not perform the functions of any public office, 
and shall not without approval of the President in each case. hold any 
office of emolument other the office of the Ombudsman or engage in 
any occupation for reward outside of his office. 
Such a state of affairs makes it diftlcult for the Ombudsman to deal objectively with the 
Executiw, particularly in handling matters relating to office of the State Presidency. It is very 
likely that he cannot bite the hand that feeds him/her. Hence this could negatively affect the 
quality of judgement in such cases. At another lewl. it can be argued that once appointed the 
Ombudsman may engage in other lucrative activities as long as helshe has the approval of the 
President. Fombad (200 I :62), is of the vievv that. .. there is a danger that. in exchange for being 
allovved to increase his income by taking lip other engagements. the Ombudsman may be 
tempted to relinquish his independence". The major argument emanating from this assertion is 
that such clauses may be open for abuse if not carefully monitored. 
Although the tenure of the Ombudsman is reasonable and well speJt out in the Act a recent 
de\elopment is worth mentioning. The first Ombudsman has had his tenure extended although 
the Act does not provide for an extension. 'rhe Act is hO\vever silent on this matter. Hence it is 











It is on the basis of the above observations that it has been suggested that "'in order to enhance 
the independence of the office of the Ombudsman. he must be appointed by and be answerable 
to Parliament and not the Executive" (Lebotse. 1999:67). To Lebotse. as it stands, "the 
Ombudsman is answerable to the President because Section 9(2) of the Act requires him to 
submit an annual report to the president who shall put it before parliament" (1999:67. In this 
way. there is no way the office of the Ombudsman can objectiwly investigate the office of the 
President and make enforceable recommendations since the President can decide not to take or 
hijack any report implicating his/her office from reaching Parliament. 
4.4.4 Lack of a Parliamentary Committee for Ombudsman 
The apparent limited independence of the office of the Ombudsman is due in part to the fact 
that there is no Parliamentary Committee to either (wersee its operations and activities or 
consider its reports. This position has been alluded to by the Ombudsman himself when he 
submitted that: 
The amendment of the Ombudsman Act should include provision for a 
Parliamentary Select Committee. the composition or \vhich to be 
solely determined by the National Assembly. The Ombudsman will 
then from time to time approach the committee with regard to any 
matters in respect to functions of the institution: such matters will 
include estimates of the expenses and allowances for each tlnancial 
year to be presented to Parliament for approval (Ombudsman. 
1997/98:7). 
Such an arrangement would give impetus to more political will to empower and SUppOlt the 











maintain a high reputation and integrity to other institutions and the society at large. It should 
also be stated for the record that the issue of having oversight institutions in Botswana 
directly reporting to the President and not to Parliament is an undesirahle phenomenon. 
Currently. the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) and the Independent 
Electoral Commission (lEC) also directly report to the President. This trend greatly 
undermines the impartiality and independence of these institutions. 
4.4.5 Limited Jurisdiction and Powers 
Another concern on the Ombudsman in Botswana is \vith regard to the Act that establishes 
the institution -legislative failures. There is a general concern that the Ombudsman Act does 
not define \vhat maladministration and/or injustice is. and has left this to he decided upon 
discretionally by the Ombudsman. Similarly. the Act gives the Ombudsman limited 
jurisdiction as stipulated by Section 4 of the Ombudsman Act. 1995. As per Section 4. the 
Ombudsman shall not investigate any action or action taken in respect to any of the 
following: 
(a) Matters certified by the President or a ~1 inister to atTect relations or 
dealings between the Government of Botswana and any other 
Government or any international organisation:(b) Action taken for the 
purposes of protecting the security of th~ state or of investigating 
crime. including action taken with respect to passports for either of 
those purposes;(c) The commencement or conduct of civil or criminal 
proceedings in any court;(d) Action taken in respect of appointments 
to offices or other employment in the sen ice of the Government of 
Botswana or appointments made by or \\ith the approval of the 
President or any Minister, action taken in relation to any person as the 











Action taken with respect to orders or directions to the Botswana 
Police Force or Botswana Defence Force or member thereof:(t) The 
grant of honours, awards or privileges within the gift of the 
President;(g) Action in matters relating to contractual or other 
commercial dealings with members of the public other than action by 
an authority mentioned in section 3 (6):(11) Action taken in any coumry 
outside Botswana by or on behalf of any oHicer representing the 
Government of Botswana or any officer of that Government:( i) Any 
action which by virtue of any provision of this Act or any other 
enactment may be enquired into by the law. 
It is clear that "matters not to be investigated by the Ombudsman are many and significant" 
(Good, 2004: 119). This leaves the office of the Ombudsman with little to do. although it can 
safely be argued that a lot of injustices and malpractices are going undetected or unresolved 
on these "no-go zones" as defended by the legislation. This could augur well with the 
argument that the design of the Ombudsman \\itl1 limited powers and jurisdiction is a 
reflection of the object of the legislature when it passed the legislation: hence the status quo 
is regarded as normal. From the foregoing. it is quite clear that the exclusions and the 
selective application of the Act is unjustified and counter-productive in the sense that it is at 
loggerheads with tenets or principal values of the institution which are to ensure fairness. 
inclusiveness. objectivity. transparency and accountability: the important features of good 
governance that it seeks to promote. This has also been confirmed by the Ombudsman 
himself. when he reported that: 
I have felt a keen sense of helplessness and ti'Llstration in not being 
able to investigate complaints of maladministration relating to public 
service personnel matters. presently exducled from jurisdiction JI1 











F1ll1her to this. the report submits that: 
The ratio of reports emanating from the public ser\lce concerning 
employment and appointment as compared \vith others with which the 
office has jurisdiction is too disproportionate. Since however. these 
falls outside of the Ombudsman jurisdictional remit they must 
necessarily be turned away much to the chagrin of those concerned, 
(Ombudsman 1997/98:8). 
Consequent to Section 4(g), the Ombudsman is also precluded from investigating 
action in matters relating to contractual or other commercial dealings between 
government and members of the public. This has become too much a limiting factor to 
individuals when they are to demand better servicc and value for money from private 
providers of public services. In my opinion, in as much as govcrnment is accountable 
to deliver services to the public or its citizens. the private sector companies contracted 
to provide public goods and services should equally be accountable to the people. 
Flowing from the above, it goes without saying that somehow the Act and in 
particular section 4(g), should be amended such that it reflects current government 
reforms towards privatisation or contracting out of the provision of public services as 
\vell as provision of same thorough Public- Private ~Partnerships. For the Act to stand 
the test of time, it has to ensure that the office is empowered to investigate the 
provision of services by private companies if there are complaints from citizens 
regarding a service provided. 











The Ombudsman like other government departments and agencIes IS faced with 
capacity constraints. Most of the capacity constraints emanate from shortage of funds 
to finance its activities. needs and programmes. According to the Ombudsman report 
of2003i04: 
Shortage of staff continues to pose a major challenge. By way of 
example. all investigators double on additional duties such as 
Coordinating Performance Improvement. HIY / AIDS. Gender and 
Equality, Public Relations Unit. Information Communication 
Technology. Disaster Management etc. This necessarily results in a 
great deal of strain on these officers. An audit carried out by 
management consultants from the Department of Public Service 
Management confirmed that the resultant \vorkload on the 
investigators IS 111 excess of 30% of their expected workload 
(Ombudsman, 2003/04:7). 
From the above assertion. one can rightly deduce that the office is less specialised in 
terms of personnel for its varying internal programmes. As per the report, the 
shortage of staff is compounded by the fact that "due to budgetary constraints. 
attempts to beef up strength in terms of more investigators have not been successful" 
(Ombudsman. 2003/04:7). Hence this has further debilitative effects on decentralising 
functions of the office to other areas. In his 0\\11 words. the Public Protector 
submitted that: 
As a fUl1her result of the national budget deficit. I lla\e abandoned the 
early decision to open additional branch offices in strategic areas 
across the country. Circuit investigations remain an alternative. This 
alternative has however been placed on hold on account of resource 











As a result of the above, the Ombudsman, office operates only two offices; one national at 
the City of Gaborone, and a decentralised office at the City of Francistown, which is 
inadequate given the country's sparsely, distributed population. Hence it is difficult and 
costly for people from elsewhere in the country to physically visit the tvvo service centres. 
4.4.7 Delayed Response to Correspondence 
Most of the annllal reports express concern on the slav\' pace at which the government 
bureaucracy responds to correspondence. Government ministries. departments. and local 
authorities have been pointed and accused of being less responsive not only to the needs 
and aspirations of the people but even to general correspondence. In the words of the 
Ombudsman: 
remam concerned about the senous delays in the public servIce 
timeous attendance of correspondence. Business of government 
throughout the world is primarily transacted through correspondence. 
Failure to attend to correspondence IS necessarilv disastrous 
(Ombudsman, 2003/04: 7). 
From the 2003/04 Ombudsman report, it is quite clear that there is laxity in government 
offices. This is confirmed by the report when it says" new mail is left f()r days in in-
coming trays of officers that are on leave ... the ad\'ent of electronic mail has had little 
impact to date and remains relatively unused"(Ombudsman. 2003/04:7). This particular 
report observes that "long delays to attend to correspondence and resolve even simple 
complaints encourage an environment that is conduci\'e to illegal transactions between 











it prolongs the time that is taken to resolve or determine whether a claim is genuine or not, 
and further delays dispute resolution . 
.. &,4.8 Delays in Finalisation of criminal matters 
As the words of the Ombudsman, -' ... delays in the finalisation of criminal matters in all 
the courts remain another serious concern in the dispensation of justice" (Ombudsman, 
2003/04:8). This assertion is in contradiction of section 5 and related provisions on the 
protection of right to personal liberty as prescribed by the Constitution of Botswana. It is 
against this background that convicted prisoners at the magistrate court entitled to an 
automatic right of appeal to the High Court experience long delays in the execution of 
their appeals. 
From a humanitarian and human rights perspectiw. this state of affairs should not at any 
point be condoned. It deprives prison inmates of the right to: fair trial vvithin a reasonable 
time and equal justice as enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of Botswana. The 
observation by the Ombudsman. in this regard. is a strength that needs to be nurtured and 
applauded. It demonstrates that, although the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction on 
the courts with regard to judicial decisions. he can scrutinise their administrative 
functions. 
·t4.9 Poor Grievance Handling Systems 
A study of the specific cases as captured in the annual reports. demonstrates that some of the 











the respectiYe departments. This is suggestive of the fact that either there is no organisational 
complaints' handling systems or that the public service lacks dispute handling skills. This is 
confirmed by the report of 2003/04 where it recommends that "individual ministries and 
departments should establish more formal ised internal complaints handling mechanisms" 
(Ombudsman. 2003/04:8). Internal dispute resolution mechanisms will not in any way 
duplicate or conflict with the role of the Ombudsman. they \\ould at best ensure that the 
available meagre resources are used on deserving cases. 
4.5.0 Disregard of the Ombudsman's Recommendations by the Office of the President 
A specific example in point is the impending case regarding a complaint lodged by the 
Botsvvana Congress Party (BCP), the then official Opposition party in Bots\vana's 'shining 
multi-party democracy'. The allegations concerns" public ofticers accompanying the Vice 
President Lt. General Seretse Khama Ian Khama. and '" the V ice President piloting 
Botswana Defenee Force aircraft following his departure from the force'< (Ombudsman 
Report. 2001102: 3). A report following the Ombudsman' s discretion to investigate the matter 
together with recommendations was compiled and sent to the Office of the President as per 
procedure for action. The investigation revealed that the accompanying of the Vice President 
by the District Commissioner. Mr Nono Macheke and Kgosi Sediegeng Kgamane Regent 
Bammangwato on party political activities was irregular as per Public Service Act 
CAP:20:01 General Order number 38. The then Permanent Secretary to the President's view 
regarding same v:vas that "the two public officers and all other public otlicers other than 
security personnel should limit their role to only (own emphasis) receiving dignitaries at their 
point of arrival and bidding them farewell at their point of departure whenever they are on 











arrangement more so that protocol dictates as such. According to the Ombudsman, "the 
presence of public officers accompanying the Vice President on party political meetings is 
not only against the spirit of General Order 38 but gives the perception that such public 
officers are furthering the interests of such political party"(Ombudsman. 2003/04:8). On the 
basis of the above observation, the Ombudsman recommended that: 
His Excellency the President directs tbe Permanent Secretary to the 
President or the Director of Public Service \1anagement to issue a new 
directive to all public officers in the light of the concerns and 
conclusions I have reached sustaining the Be P' s complaint 
(Ombudsman, 2001:8). 
Regarding the second complaint on the Vice President Hying Botswana Defence (BDF) 
aircrafts. the Ombudsman found that the Commander or the BDF had the following concerns 
regarding the matter, that: 
The Vice President was no longer a member of the force ... could no 
longer be authorised nor disciplined in the e\ent of contravening the 
relevant regulations of the Botswana Defence Force Act as regards 
offences relating to property. His Honour the Vice President could no 
longer be called upon by the commander to answer any disciplinary 
hearing in the event that Army property \\as lIsed in contravention of 
BDF Act the regulations hereunder and/or oth.:r standing orders that 
the Commander may legitimately publish II)r obserYCltion by officers 
from time to time (Ombudsman, 2001 :9). 
Interestingly. the Vice President confirmed during the inyestigations that "he was given 
permission by His Excellency the President to continue tlying thc aircra11 even as he was no 
longer in the army" (Ombudsman, 2003/04:9). The Ombudsman had thus found that "in fact it 











Excellency the President but whether it is due compliance \\ith the BDF Act. and specifically 
whether the Act allows persons outside of the BDF to use service property"(Ombudsman, 
2001: 1 0). He concluded that only persons subject to the Act can properly be authorised to use 
service property. and thus recommended that: 
His Excellency the President brings to the attention of His Honour the 
Vice President of the inadmissibility of personally flying BDF Aircraft 
in the light of provisions of the BDF Act CAP:21 :05 (Ombudsman. 
2001:10). 
Despite the above findings and recommendations. the official position regarding the 
matters from the President is not yet known. Besides. even the National Assembly has 
never been given the opportunity to discuss the special report as dictated by Section 8(2) 
of the Ombudsman Act that, "where corrective action is not taken withil1 reasonable time, 
the special report has to be tabled before Parliament". The opposition has hitherto 
requested the President to comply with the Ombudsman' s recommendation. to no avail. 
The fact that there is no Standing Parliamentary Committee for the Ombudsman has 
\\orsened the matter since there is virtually no one to follow-up the matter although the 
abuse still continues. This has far reaching consequences in that it shows how leaders are 
at times not committed to the values of good governance. which they publicly espouse to, 
and their lack of political will to lead by example. The President has failed to officially 
account for his decision to allow his Vice President to continue flying BDF planes even 
though he is no longer a member. This comes as a second action of favouritism tovvards 
the Vice President by the President. In 1998. Seretse Khama Ian Khama was appointed 
Vice President and subsequently given sabbatical leave although it was called off 











the civic society. The chronology of these events: the a\vard of unsatisfactorily qualified 
sabbatical leave (a specialized type of leave for academics). and the subsequent 
authorisation to 11y BDF aircraft after leaving the army to assume political office dents the 
country's democratic credentials. Generally. there is a lot of public outcry concerning 
Khama's conduct in public office (Molomo. 2000: 102). Hence an observation made by 
Molomo that "Khama is said to be contemptuous to established norms of governance". 
(2000: 1 02). 
To date. nothing has been heard in the form of official response from Office of the 
Presidency. Instead. the President was quoted in the media as having said that "as the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. I haw authorised His Honour the Vice 
President to pilot government aircraft when occasion warrants. and this he does" 
(Tutwane. 2004: 1). The President was further quoted as saying that "he and Khama are 
entitled to official transport at all times. and that this includes government aircraft" 
(Tutwane. 2004: 1). Despite the above remarks. the public and the Ombudsman are still 
mvaiting official response in the form of compliance or otherv.ise. Such statements make 
and render the office of the Ombudsman nugatory (Tutwane. 2004: J). The concern 
therefore is that this may send a wrong signal or precedent for similar instances in future. 
in that other government departments and/or public officials may decide to emulate the 
Office of the President. and disregard recommendations for corrective action from the 
Ombudsman's office. An editorial aptly captured this matter \vell when it said that: 
It is an accepted norm that leaders must lead by example. This impJ ies 
that they have to set the right morals. This expectation places a heavy 
responsibility 011 elected leaders to be exemplary at all times. They 
must respect the values. traditions and institutions of the land before 











This has somehow lent credibility to the perception that oversight bodies and other 'check 
and balances' mechanisms on governmental action. cannot say anything to the Office of the 
President since it is the highest office in the country. There is a general feeling, to borrow 
Good's (1997:547) expression. that "the Presidency and the Executive are accountable to 
themselves". This has the potential of signalling a \\Tong message or perception that the 
Executive branch is capable of properly monitoring its own Llse of power or is free from 
abuse of power; hence it need not be subjected to scrutiny by independent institutions like the 
Ombudsman. It is on such rare high profile cases that people tend to assess the effectiveness 
of the Ombudsman, and if a stalemate like this occurs. the institution's independence. 











5.0 CHAPTER FIVE 
COMI> ARA TIVE ASPECTS 
This chapter develops the comparative aspects of the study and subsequently sets out 
recommendations. 
5.1.1 Jurisdiction and Functions 
The Public Protector in South Africa has a wide jurisdiction co\ering the three spheres of 
government and organs of the state as provided for by Section 181 of the Constitution, and 
the Public Protector Act of 1994. The t,,\O pieces of legislation do not make express 
exclusion of any institution of the state from scrutiny or investigation by the office. In 
contrast. the Ombudsman in Botswana has jurisdiction on investigation of Issues of 
maladministration by government ministries. departments and parastatals as provided for by 
the Ombudsman Act of 1994. However, there are instances whereby certain activities are 
expressly excluded from investigation as per Section 4 (a) to (i) of the Act as already 
indicated elsewhere on this paper. This is a serious concern that hinders and curtails the 
effective performance of the institution. Hence the South African jurisdiction can be 
emulated or used as a benchmark as it appears to enjoy a wide jurisdiction. It is however 
worth mentioning that although the Public Protector seems to be enjoying unlimited 
jurisdiction as provided for by the Constitution of South Africa of 1996 and the Public 
Protector Act of 1994, it has been observed with regard to high profik cases such as the 
Oilgate Scandal: Sarafina 2 and the Arms Deal that there is a tendency by the Public 











the Public Protector has vast powers, there is a t('ndency to underutilise them, resulting in 
decisions not being adequately accounted for by the government to the people to serve 
narrow political party interests. 
5.1.2 Manner of Appointment and Tenure of office 
The t\\O cases have different proVISIOns on the appointment of the Public 
Protector/Ombudsman and the respective tenure of office. In South Africa as per Section 2A 
of the Public Protector Act, the incumbent is appointed by the President on the 
recommendation of a Parliamentary Committee. and subsequent approval by the National 
Assembly. In this manner, appointment of the Public Protector clearly demonstrates the 
involvement of the National Assembly, the institution that the Public Protector is performing 
the accountability and oversight function on behalf of. Besides. because all political parties in 
the National Assembly are represented in the Parliamentary Committee. the process of 
appointing the Public Protector is more democratic. although it does not escape the likelihood 
of political manipulation by those who form the majority in Parliament. 
As for Botswana, the Ombudsman as per Section :2 (2) of the Ombudsman Act "is appointed 
by the President in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition in the National 
Assembly". The exact nature of this consultation is however not specified. An observation 
can be made that if consultation by the President means suggesting a nominee who is a card-
carrying member of his party to the leader. then there is a greater chance of appointing the 
incumbent on the basis of political patronage rather than merit or any other criteria. Since the 










suggested that Botswana should better adopt the South African mode of appointment to avoid 
creating a perception that the Ombudsman is a presidential political appointee. 
With regards to tenure of office, provisions of the two Acts categorically state the required 
time period. In South Africa, as per Section 2A (1), .. the length of tenure does not exceed 
seven years". In Botswana, as per Section 2 (5) of the Ombudsman Act. "the Ombudsman's 
tenure of office is limited to four years". Surprisingly, the first Ombudsman had his tenure 
extended for another term despite the express provision captioned above. Whether the Leader 
of the Opposition in the National Assembly had input in the extension can only be 
speculated. It has however. emerged that he will be retiring at the end of October 2005 
(Botswana Daily News, 21 October 2005). 
Regarding security of tenure, in South Africa because of the mode of appointment, there 
tends to be protection of the incumbent since he/she cannot be removed from office without 
the involvement of. and final approval by the National Assembly. To some extent. it can be 
argued that the Public Protector's tenure in South Africa is more secure than in Botswana 
since the removal of an Ombudsman from office is more of a legislative process than a 
judicial one. In Botswana. the Ombudsman can be removed from office by the President on a 
recommendation of a Judicial Tribunal as per Section 2 (6) of the Ombudsman Act, which 
provides thus: 
The provisions of subsections (2) and (5) of Section 97 of the 
constitution (which relate to removal of High Court Judges from 
office) shalL with modifications as may be considered necessary, apply 
to the office of the Ombudsman. 
Such a provision cannot be taken for granted since it could be manipulated to frustrate the 











reservation on the Judicial Tribunal emanates from the fact that High Court judges who are 
supposed to decide on the fate of the Ombudsman if the need arise. could make decisions that 
they feel are acceptable to the President since they are also appointed by the President. Hence 
they cannot bite the hand that feeds them. This could compromise their independence. 
Conversely, this could make the Ombudsman feel less motivated and reluctant to investigate 
administrative issues involving the office of the President 
5.1.3 Role of the Parliamentary Committee 
From the literature survey, the existence of a Parliamentary Committee on the Ombudsman is 
good in that it tends to support the institution operationally and politically. The committee is 
responsible for overseeing the operations, activities and monitor the performance of the office. 
It helps to nurture. tap and solicit the political will that is necessary for acceptance, trust. 
integrity and confidence needed by members of the public for the effective performance of the 
institution. 
In South Africa. the existence of this committee is an important ingredient and is indicative of 
political commitment to the effective and efficient operation of the Public Protector. In 
contrast, there is no Parliamentary Committee to oversee activities, operations, monitor and 
evaluate the performance of the Ombudsman in Botswana. In a nutshelL there is no committee 
to report to like it is the case in South Africa. This aspect puts the Ombudsman in a precarious 
position. Thus the institution lacks the necessary political support to persuade compliance with 











This is further exacerbated by the fact that the Ombudsman does not report directly to 
Parliament but rather to the President who can if he/she feels implicated by specific reports 
decide to hijack them before they reach Parliament. By extension. it can be argued that the 
case of the Vice President flying BDF airplanes and being accompanied by public office-
holders on party political activities has suffered from this type or arrangement. Perhaps if there 
was a Parliamentary Committee responsible for this committee. the matter could have been 
easily followed up. llence it has been hanging in the balance since April 2001 when 
recommendations were made regarding the complaint. 
5.1.4 Independence 
Constitutionally and legally. the Public Protector is supposed to be an independent institution. 
In practice. this is not the case. Independence can only be realized when the Public Protector 
has financial autonomy as well administrative/functional independence. Regarding financial 
independence. the Public Protector receives its money through the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development in the form of a vote. Although this may seem attractive, Corder 
(1999:56) notes that "it is not desirable to have the institution and similar ones to depend on 
budget allocations received through the very department they are required to monitor". Hence 
he recommends "a direct vote for the institution or a joint vott' for all institutions supporting 
constitutional democracy" (Corder, 1999:56). The Bots\\'ana Ombudsman suffers the same 
problem of limited financial independence as its South African counterpart. The Ombudsman 
receives its annual budget allocations through the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public 
Administration in the form of a vote. The undesirability of such an arrangement is that it has 











Administratively. the Public Protector in South Africa enjoys some independence in that the 
Public Protector Act provides that the office hires its own stafT and engages specialised 
personnel in the execution of its duties at remuneration. terms and conditions determined by 
the Public Protector. This is a welcome development although it can be compromised by 
budget limitations. As for Botswana, the Ombudsman does not hire its own staff; instead it 
relies on staff seconded from other government departments through the government central 
employing agency. the Department of Public Service Management (DPSM). As indicated 
earlier on. this has potential for conflict of interest during investigations involving departments 
that officers might want to join in future. or departments that they originally belong. 
Conversely. DPSM could use manpower allocation ceilings to clcny the Ombudsman office the 
required personnel for its effective functioning. 
5.1.5 Annual Accountability Reporting Systems 
Both countries have deficient annual accountability reporting mechanisms. This is indicated 
by the lack of standard performance criteria as indicated by the lack of comprehensive 
performance measurement, strategic plans. performance indicators. monitoring and evaluation 
systems. Due to the weak performance criteria and indicators. it is very difficult if not 
impossible to objectively measure the performance of this institution. As for South Africa, the 
general observation is that although legislation exists such as the Public Service Regulations 
and the Public Financial Management Act of 1999 to guide the reporting process. this has to a 
large extent not been implemented. This goes hand in glove \\ith a general observation made 











It is \videly known - and indeed acknowledged by government that 
there is a major gap between policy and its implementation: in respect 
both of broad policy intent and the implementation. 
Moreover, the institutions in the tvvo countries have poor follow up on recommendations and 
general committee matters as there is no provision or clear-cut procedure for doing that. Hence 
in most cases. issues just vanish into thin air 'v\ ithout having been adequately addressed. 
Besides. the lack of debate at the committee level and in Parliament further constrains the 
effectiveness of the institution. It should however be acknowledged that it is common 
knowledge that Parliaments worldwide, and in South Africa and Botswana in particular, are 
under resourced. They lack the necessary expertise and competency to perform accountability 
and oversight functions. 
5.1.6 High Profile Political Issues 
There is a widespread perception that the Public Protector/Ombudsman in both countries has 
not adequately addressed complaints relating to party political matters. In essence. there is a 
feeling or opinion that the institution is failing in most politically charged matters involving 
members of the ruling party. 
As for South Africa, examples of such cases are the infamous Oilgate scandal; the 
appointment of Dr. Goqwana as Health MEC by the Eastern Cape Premier and his private 
business interests; the Play Sarafina 2. Like Good (2004:78-79) has observed. ··the attitudes of 
party leadership are... highly inl1uential over the accountabil ity of many ministers and 
parliamentarians." Due to the political patronage involving top ANC members and ruling 











There is a perception that the political executives manipulate existing circumstances and make 
it possible for their members to evade genuine calls for them to account for their actions. 
On the other hand, in Botswana, for example, the complaint regarding the Vice President 
flying BDF airplanes and being accompanied by public officials on political party activities is 
high on the agenda. Despite the Ombudsman recommendation and the corrective advice given, 
the Executive has not found it necessary to account for this apparent abuse of public resources 
110t on government business but clearly on ruling political party activities. The Vice President 
continues to fly BDF planes against the good advice of the Ombudsman (MmegL 3 October 
2005). The general laxity that the Executive has demonstrated on the above mentioned cases 
boils down to justify the growing perception that there is lack of political commitment to this 
institution. This, it can be argued, is exacerbated by the fact that the parliamentary system in 
both countries has produced a weak legislature. As observed by Camay & Gordon (2004) and 
Corder (1999), for South Africa the close links between the Executive and the Legislature 
renders it difficult for the Legislature to hold the Executive to account on its actions mainly 
due to party discipline and upward accountability. There is a general belief that the difference 
between the ruling party and the government is a blurred one. More often than not, Legislative 
members of the majority party in government are hesitant to call members of their own party 
and 'government' to account because they fear the risk of losing political protection. An 
article by February (2005), observes that: 
Members of the majority party more often than not find it hard to 
separate their political role from their parliamentary role. The arms 











Another interesting case in Botswana is with regard to a motion on the location of the second 
University of Botswana. The motion sponsored by the opposition Botswana Congress Party 
(BCP) Gaborone Central MP, Dumelang Saleshando. "requested the Executive to review its 
decision to locate the second University in the Serowe-Palapye area in favour of areas 
recommended by the Task Force" (Molaodi. 2005a). Initially. the m~jority of the 
parliamentarians were in support of this motion on the basis that cabinet cannot forgo a 
recommendation made by technical experts for theirs. \vhich was less in/()fmed. Parliament 
adjourned and upon its resumption the majority of MPs from the ruling party backbench, who 
had initially supported the motion. reneged from their earlier position following from what 
transpired at a Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) caucus. Apparently. members who 
supported the motion were admonished for attacking their own. and reminded of party 
discipline. A party position was adopted that the motion should be rejected and this is what 
happened when the debate resumed. The matter \vas tinally put to a vote \vhereupon the BDP, 
Llsing its numerical strength. defeated thc motion. 15 members voted for the motion, 31 
against. and 12 abstained (Molaodi. 2005b). This shovvs the limited cxtent to which the 
executive can be asked to account and how they can turn to their political home for rescue. 
MP Saleshando made it clear after the motion calling. the executive to account was defeated 
that "the BDP MP's could not support the motion because ... BOP backbench was one thing 
with cabinet hence the caucus position to oppose the motion" (Botsyvana Daily News: 14 
March 2005). Given the circumstances. and the opposition's numerical weakness, it could not 
successfully require the executive to account for an unreasonable decision. 











Comparatively. the South African Public Protector is more accessible than its Botswana 
counterpart in that it operates at a national level. has regional otTices \vithi 11 the provinces and 
runs satellite mobile clinics for the rural communities. As for Botswana. there is a national 
office at the capital city (Gaborone) and the only decentralised office at City of Francistown. 
These offices are concentrated on the eastern part of the country leaving the western region 
isolated. Although the office had planned to open offices in other places and conducting 
satellite clinics to service its rural clients this has not been possible due to human and financial 
constraints (Ombudsman. 2003/04:7). The office in Botswana therefore finds it difficult to 
permeate the rural areas. There is need for the Ombudsman to step-up its public education 
campaign on its role and functions in the rural areas. [t needs to increase regular contact with 











5.2 Conclusion and Recommendations 
It is apparent that the institution of the Ombudsman/Public Protector plays a significant role in 
making government ministries, departments and other agencies accountable. It is one of the 
institutions that clearly demonstrate the commitment of a government to democratic ideals of 
good governance: accountability, openness, promotion of human rights. and transparency. 
However. requirements for achieving these noble objectives are not quite often met. The 
challenges range from the complex nature of financial and functional independence, from 
political manipulation of the office, and from a lack of political commitment and will to 
support the institution. 
The systematic study of the Ombudsman in the 1\\0 countries has shown that although its 
existence has potential towards ensuring transparency and accountability 011 Executive action, 
a function they perform for and on behalf of Parliament. it is to a large extent handicapped by 
a number of inherent 'weaknesses'. The weaknesses range from restrained independence from 
the Executive owing to a fusion of powers between the Legislature and the Executive branches 
of government (Parliamentary System Relations): ruling political party patronage or 
manipulation: and the general lack of comprehensi\e peri()l'mance C\'aluation and monitoring 
systems. The yvay forward therefore is to address these myriad challenges head-on. 
Governments that are seriously committed to issues of good governance should always strive 
to derive the best from the institution. Hence they need to gradually work on improving the 
functioning of this institution through legislation and other change management approaches. It 
should hovvever be noted that change is not an event but a process. Hence, the sooner the 











It is recommended, that the two countries should as a matter or urgency put in place strategic 
plans and develop comprehensive, objective perf~lrmance programmes and related programme 
performance measures or indicators. This would enable them to easily monitor and evaluate 
their own performance. Consequently, this would make their annual reporting easy as they 
would be able to state whether or not their predetermined objectives have been achieved, and 
if not the reasons could be advanced and necessary adj llstments made. The development of 
performance indicators will not only institutional ise the ombudsman's performance. it would 
also ensure relative ease for outside or independent evaluation or the institution's 
performance. Hence this would help reduce the Ul1sa\oury perception questions regarding the 
institution's relevance and efficacy. 
[t should however be noted and ackno\vledged that the mere existence and establishment of 
the Ombudsman institution is not an end in itself. but a means to an end. The establishment of 
the institution for symbolic value, to borrow Ayeni' s ( 1996:51 ) phrase. as a demonstration of 
adherence to democratic ideals on its own is inadequate. In essence. it is the utilitarian value 
or ability of the institution to ensure executive accountability and oversight or compliance 
\vi!h its recommendations that matters most. In my opinion. the symbolic value of the 
institution in the t\VO countries has long been achieved. Hence it is recommended that they 
should strive to achieve the utilitarian value. This is the inevitable challenge that needs gradual 
transformation so that the accountability and oversight functions can be achieved, otherwise 
they will remain a pipe dream. Hence the perception that the institution serves ruling party 












The Ombudsman institutions the world-over should netv,ork amongst themselves and with 
other institutions through avenues sllch as the African Ombudsman Association, African 
Union. International Ombudsman Institute and the African Peer Review .Mechanism. These 
institutional networking forums are a platform for assisting one another. sharing of ideas and 
experiences on common problem areas. 
It is also recommended that South Africa and Botswana should continually evaluate the 
relevance of the institution so that it is in-keeping \\ith dynamic demands. As for Botswana in 
particular. the legislature should seriously consider amending the current Ombudsman Act as 
it contains inconsistencies and ambiguities such as Section 4 of the Act which exempts certain 
institutions from scrutiny. The selective application of the Act is undesirable for a country that 
prides itself with respecting the rule of law. and one of the longest and vibrant democracies in 
Africa 
It is further recommended that all government institutions should change their attitude towards 
the Ombudsman institution, and see it not as an enemy but as complementing the whole public 
service's grievance handling system. office of the Presidency is equally bound in this 
regard for providing exemplary leadership. The success of this institution heavily relies on the 
political support it gets from the government and all the political parties. This support will 
ensure that the Ombudsman is allocated enough resources to execute its mandate, and a clear 
demonstrative culture of complying with recommendations. v\'hich is critical for building the 
desired integrity, trust and confidence in the institution. 
The Ombudsman institution should be seen as an institution that is close to Parliament 











to Parliament. To make this relationship strong the setting LIp of a Standing Parliamentary 
Committee on the Ombudsman is long overdue. All parliamentarians should receive formal 
training in the form of short courses on parliamentary role and procedures, operation of the 
legislature in relation to the executive, the need for accountability and oversight functions, and 
the relationship between government and ruling political parties. This could in the long run 
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